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Victim Harm, Retributivism and Capital
Punishment: A Philosophical Critique
of Payne v. Tennessee
R. P. Peerenboom*
The politically powerful victim's rights movement has brought the
effects of crime on victims and their families into the public eye.' One
result is that legislators and courts have given increasing weight to vic-
tim harm in determining the gravity of the offense and the punishment
due the offender.2
Harm, results, and consequences have always played some role in our
penal system. For instance, murder is more serious, and punished more
severely, than robbery. Similarly, if one shoots at someone intending to
kill but misses, the result being that no one dies, there is no murder,
* Ph.D., Philosophy, University of Hawaii, 1990. I thank Vivian Berger, R. Kent
Greenawalt, Gerard Lynch and Ronald Replogle for their many helpful comments, and
Dean Berger for providing a draft of her forthcoming article on Payne.
1. See Franik Carrington & George Nicholson, The Victim's Rights Movement: An
Idea Whose Time Has Come, 11 PEPP. L. REv. 1 (1984); Maureen McLeod, Victim
Participation at Sentencing, 22 CrM. L BuL.. 501 (1986).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-1515, 3663, 3664 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (authorizing the in-
clusion of victim impact statements in presentence reports). Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure section 32(c)(2) provides: "The presentence report shall contain: (D)
[v]erified information stated in a nonargumentative style containing an assessment of
the financial, social, psychological, and medical impact upon, and cost to, any individ-
ual against whom the offense has been committed." FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(D). At
the time of Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), when the Court first considered
the issue of -the admissibility of victim impact evidence, at least 36 states had en-
acted legislation permitting some form of victim impact statement. Id. at 509 n.12;
McLeod, supra note 1, at 507 & n.22. By August 1987, 47 states allowed such state-
ments. Marlene A. Young, A Constituti6nal Amendment for Victims of Crime: The
Victims' Perspective, 34 WAYNE L REv. 51, 62 (1987). Justice Scalia explicitly ac-
knowledged the "outpouring of popular concern for what has come to be known as
'victims' rights.'" Booth, 482 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For an empirical study
of the effect of victim participation and a bibliography of several leading articles on
victim impact evidence, see Edna Erez & Pamela Tontodonato, The Effect of Victim
Participation in Sentencing on Sentence Outcome, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 451 (1990).
and one faces at most a lesser punishment for attempt.3
The emphasis, however, on harm, results, and consequences is
antithetical to the doctrine of Kantian retributivism. Under the Kantian
doctrine, punishment is to be meted according to the offender's
culpability, defined in terms of mens rea, mental states, and intentions,
regardless of the unintended consequences.4 Few would wish to punish
as a murderer the cautious driver whose car hits an ice patch, spins out
of control and kills a pedestrian. The harm to the victim is as great as if
she were murdered, but the intent, and hence moral culpability, of the
driver differs significantly from that of a cold-blooded murderer.
The inherent tension in these two lines of penal philosophy came to a
head in a 1987 case, Booth v. Maryland,6 where the Supreme Court
considered for the first time the appropriateness of victim impact
evidence in sentencing. The specific issue in Booth was whether the
Constitution permits consideration of victim impact during the sentenc-
ing phase of a capital trial.' The State, in accordance with Maryland
law, had submitted to the jury a victim impact statement,7 describing i)
the personal characteristics of the victims, ii) the impact of the murder
on the victims' family, and iii) the family members' characterization of
and opinions about the crime, the defendant and the appropriate
sentence.8 The Court held that use of victim impact statements in
. 3. Section 5.05 of the Model Penal Code provides: "An attempt . .. to commit a
[capital crime or a] felony of the first degree is a felony of the second degree."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05 (1985).
4. IMMANUEL KANT, PROLEGOMENA, GENERAL DMSIONS OF THE MurAPHYSlCS OF
MORALS, IV 38 (Hastie trans.) (stating that a crime is an "intentional transgres-
sion-that is, an act accompanied with the consciousness that it is a transgression").
Recently, Jeffrie Murphy has challenged the orthodox view of Kant as the
prototypical retributivist. Murphy argues that Kant's remarks about punishment, when
taken together, may not provide any coherent theory of punishment at all. See Mur-
phy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L REV. 509 (1987). For a
discussion of retributivism and a comparison of Kant's (or the orthodox interpretation
of Kant's) retributivism and that of the Booth Court, see infra notes 114-15, 129-39
and accompanying text.
5. 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
6. Id. at 497.
7. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c) (1957). Victim impact statements vary
from state to state. Some require victim impact evidence for felonies. See, e.g., KAN.
STAT. ANN. § ?1-4604(2) (1981). Some do not permit victim impact statements in
capital cases. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-102 (Supp. 1992), MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 279, § 4B (West Supp. 1992). The Court's ruling in Payne may lead states
that currently do not allow victim impact statements in capital cases to amend their
statutes. For a summary of victim impact statements, see Charleton T. Howard Ill,
Note, Booth v. Maryland-Death KneU for the Victim Impact Statement?, 47 MD. L
REV. 701, 733-38 app. (1988).
8. The Court reproduced the entire victim impact statement in an appendix to its
opinion. Booth, 482 U.S. at 509-15.
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capital sentence hearings violated the Eighth Amendment on the
retributive ground that such information is irrelevant to the culpability
of the defendant.' I
Four short years later, the Supreme Court abruptly reversed direc-
tion, overruling Booth in Payne v. Tennessee."° Arguing that punish-
ment is a function of both subjective guilt and objective harm, the
Court held that the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar against
victim impact evidence in a capital sentence hearing."
Payne raises two issues: Having abandoned mens rea retributi-
vism-the view that one only deserves to be punished for the acts and
consequences of acts for which one has mens rea-what penal theory
does the Court now embrace? Further, and more importantly, is this
theory justifiable?
This article challenges the normative justifiability of the Payne ruling.
Full appreciation of the critique, however, requires a clear understand-
ing of the Court's decision in Payne. Part I describes the legal context
and the Court's reasoning from Booth to Payne. Part II casts the
Court's ruling in Payne against a larger philosophical backdrop, placing
the Court's penal theory along the retributive spectrum, though at a
point far removed from the Kantian version. Part III focuses narrowly
on the precise thesis to be justified, namely the use in capital sentenc-
ing of evidence of the victim's personal characteristics and the impact
of the crime on the victim's family." More specifically, the ruling in
9. Id, at 501-02. The Court held in the alternative that the admission of victim
impact evidence "creates a' constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury may im-
pose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner." Id, at 503. On the
retributive basis of the Court's decision, see Richard S. Murphy, Comment, The Sig-
nificance of Victim Harm: Booth v. Maryland and the Philosophy of Punishment in
the Supreme Court, 55 U. CI. L REV. 1303, 1312-19 (1988).
10. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
11. Id at 2612. The Court addressed only two kinds of victim impact information:
,The personal characteristics of the victim and the impact on the family. It did not
pass judgment on the third kind: Family members' opinions about the crime, the
defendant, and the appropriate sentence. Id, at 2611 n.2.
12. Victim harm is somewhat of a misnomer. The label fits well enough for evi-
dence of the impact of the crime on the family. But evidence of the personal char-
acteristics of the victim relates primarily to the harm to society, not to the individual
victim. Obviously, any murder victim suffers harm. Indeed, a victim who does not
possess socially valuable characteristics may be harmed more than a victim who
does, at least in the former's own opinion. Wealth and social status do not ensure
that one values one's own life highly, nor does poverty and a low social status go
hand in hand with low self-worth.
Payne permits the use of such evidence even where the personal
characteristics of the victim and the impact on the family are neither
foreseen nor foreseeable.
I contend the better view is that one must have mens rea with
respect to the particular harm for which one is to be punished. The
standard of mens rea is debatable; I argue for intent. At the very least,
however, the offender must be reckless with respect to the victim's
characteristics and the family impact. The difference is important. In
Payne, the defendant was aware of, and hence arguably reckless with
respect, to, the victim's personal characteristics and family relations.
Thus, if the proper mens rea is recklessness, Payne may be rightly
decided on the substantive issue, though not necessarily on other
grounds.' If, however, the proper mens rea is intent, Payne is wrongly
decided on the substantive issue. In any event, whatever the proper
level of mens rea, Payne is wrongly reasoned. At minimum, the ruling
should be limited to prevent execution based on unforeseen and
unforeseeable harm.
Part IV examines retributivist justifications for Payne. In justifying
punishment, it is helpful to ask both whether the State has the right to
punish" and whether it is right to do so.'5 A retributivist response to
the former is that the State has the right to punish because citizens
consent to such punishment. 6 The argument of Part IV is that from an
ex ante position in which one does not know whether one will be
victim or murderer, no rational person would consent to Payne. The
rational choice is to limit punishment to consequences for which one
possessed mental culpability. Again, the required level of culpability is
debatable. The strong thesis is that no rational person would consent to
capital punishment based on unintended consequences (including
consequences for which one possessed the mens rea of recklessness);
the weak thesis is that one would not consent to capital punishment
based on unforeseen or unforseeable consequences to the victim.
13. As noted, the Booth Court held, in the alternative, that admission of victim
impact evidence created a constitutionally unacceptable risk of arbitrariness. See su-
pra note 9. The probative value of such evidence is simply outweighed by its prejudi-
cial character. The dissent in Payne insists that the majority failed to adequately ad-
dress this issue. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. Further, Payne may be
challenged on equal protection grounds. See Jonathan Willmott, Note, Victim Charac-
teristics and Equal Protection for the Lives of All: An Alternative Analysis of Booth
v. Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers and a Proposed Standard for the Admis-
sion of Victim Characteristics in Sentencing, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1045 (1990).
14. See Jeffrie Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217 passim
(1973) (discussing utilitarian and Kantian theories on punishment).
15. For a discussion of both questions with respect to capital punishment general-
ly, see HuGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT 47-63 (1987).
16. See Murphy, supra note 14, at 223-24.
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Part V explores utilitarian justifications for the Payne ruling. The
taking of life for utilitarian gains, of which capital punishment based on
consequences to the victim is but one species, is an anathema to many.
The argument here is that even assuming arguendo the morality of
trading off lives for utilitarian gains, the trade-off in Payne is not
justified. A careful examination of traditional utilitarian justifications of
punishment-rehabilitation, incapacitation, deterrence, denunciation,
and vengeance-reveals that (i) no gain is realized by imposing capital
punishment for unintended and unforeseen victim harm, (ii) the gain
could be realized at lesser cost through an approach other than capital
punishment, or (iii) the gain is not justified because it is too insignifi-
cant and at odds with other ethical principles.
I. JUDICIAL REASONING FROM BOOTH TO PAYNE
In Booth, the defendant and an accomplice robbed an elderly couple
in their home and then murdered them to avoid identification (the
victims were neighbors of the defendant). The victims were bound,
gagged, and stabbed repeatedly in the chest with a kitchen knife.'8 The
victims' son discovered the bodies two days later." Capital trials are
bifurcated in Maryland.' The first phase is to determine guilt or inno-
cence.' The second phase is to sentence.' In the first phase, the jury
found Booth guilty of two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of
robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery.' As required by a Mary-
land statute, the presentence report included a victim impact state-
ment.' Over objections of defense counsel, the prosecutor introduced
victim impact evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial.' The
jury then sentenced Booth to death. On automatic appeal, the Maryland
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence.' The Supreme
Court, in a five-to-four decision, reversed.2
17. Booth, 482 U.S. at 497-98.
18. Id, at 498.
19. Id.
20. MD. CRaI. LAW CODE ANN. § 413(a)(1992).
21. Id,
22. Id.
23. Boo%, 482 U.S. at 498.
24. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
25. BootA, 482 U.S. at 500.
26. Id. at 501.
27. Id. at 501-02. Justice Powell wrote the opinion for the Court, and was joined
The Court reasoned that the Eighth Amendment requires "'individual-
ized determination'" in capital sentencing, which means that sentencing
must be based on "'the character of the individual and the circumstanc-
es of the crime.'"' While the Court did not define "circumstances," it
did state that individual determination is a function of the defendant's
"'personal responsibility and moral guilt.'"'
The State argued that harm, specifically the negative impact of the
crime on the victim and his family, is part of the circumstances of the
crime, and thus should be considered.' Although the Court acknowl-
edged that harm might be relevant in civil or non-capital criminal con-
texts, it disagreed with respect to capital sentencing.3 The focus dur-
ing capital sentencing, must be on the defendant as a "'uniquely individ-
ual human bein[g].' Victim impact evidence, by definition, does not
focus on the defendant.
In so holding, the Booth Court embraced a mens rea retributive theo-
ry of culpability,' noting that reliance on victim impact statements
causes the capital punishment determination to turn on "factors about
which the defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant to the deci-
sion to kill."' Such factors "may be wholly unrelated to the blamewor-
thiness of a particular defendant." '
Turning to procedural concerns, the Court held that the mere intro-
duction of victim impact evidence would be unduly prejudicial, greatly
increasing the likelihood of arbitrary and capricious decisions' in
three ways. First, whether one gets the death penalty would depend on
mere luck.' Some victims will not have families. Of those that do,
by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Justice White wrote a dissent-
ing opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and Justice O'Connor.
Justice Scalia also wrote a dissent, in which Justices White, O'Connor and Rehnquist
joined.
28. Id. at 502 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983)).
29. Id. (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
30. Id. at 503.
31. Id. at 509 & n.12. For a discussion of the different contexts in which harm
may be a relevant consideration, see infra notes 142-53, 192-98 and accompanying
text.
32. Booth, 482 U.S. at 504 (alteration in original) (quoting Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
33. See infra notes 114-15, 129-39 and accompanying text. See also Murphy, supra
note 9.
34. Booth, 482 U.S. at 505.
35. Id. at 504.
36. Id. at 502-03.
37. Booth v. State, 507 A.2d 1098, 1129 (Md. 1986) (Cole, J., concurring and dis-
senting) ("[lit is arbitrary to make capital sentencing decisions based on [victim
impact statements], 'which vary greatly from case to case depending upon the ability
of a family member to express his grief.'").
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some families will be more articulate on the witness stand than oth-
ers.' Second, there would be no principled way of determininng who
is put to death and who is allowed to live.' Consideration of the
victim's worth is not a principled way to mete out capital punishment.
According to what moral principle can the legal system place a higher
value on an upper-middle-class suburbanite's life than a homeless
person's life? In the words of the Court: "[W]e are troubled by the im-
plication that defendants whose victims were assets to their community
are more deserving of punishment than those whose victims are per-
ceived to be less worthy. Of course, our system of justice does not tol-
erate such distinctions."' Third, due to the inflammatory nature of vic-
tim impact evidence, decisions would be arbitrary and capricious by
being based on emotion rather than reason.4'
The Court had one final procedural concern. Fourteenth Amendment
due process requires that the defendant have a fair opportunity to rebut
contrary evidence.' Victim impact evidence, however, is virtually im-
possible to rebut.' The defendant stands to gain little by attacking the
credibility and character of the victim's grieving wife and children."
Further, if the defendant does choose to attack the victim, introducing
evidence as to the victim's "dubious moral character," unpopularity or
estrangement from his family, such a "mini-trial" of the victim would
not only be unappealing, but would impermissibly distract the jury from
its constitutionally mandated task: to make an individualized determina-
tion of whether to execute the defendant given the character of the in-
dividual defendant and the circumstances of the crime."
Foreshadowing the majority's arguments in Payne, the four-justice
minority vigorously contested the Court's substantive theory, claiming
that the degree of punishment one deserves is a function of not only
one's internal disposition--one's mental state or subjective blamewor-
thiness--but of the "full extent of harm" caused.' As Justice White
pointed out, if one drives recklessly and kills, one's punishment will be
38. Booth, 482 U.S. at 505 & n.7.
39. Id at 506.
40. Id. at 506 n.8.
41. Id. at 508 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (opinion of
Stevens, J.)).
42. Id at 506.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 506-07 (citing Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362).
45. Id. at 507.
46. Id. at 516 (White, J., dissenting).
greater than if one drives recklessly and does not kill. Why?. Because
the harm is greater. '
Indeed, fairness demands consideration of the harm. "The State has a
legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the
defendant is entitled to put in... by reminding the sentencer that just
as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the vic-
tim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and
in particular to his family."* By offsetting the unrestricted mitigating
evidence that the defendant is allowed to introduce, victim impact evi-
dence helps balance the scales of justice."
On the procedural side, the dissenters observed that the family's abili-
ty to articulate grief is no more arbitrary or fortuitous than the ability
of any two prosecutors to make arguments or any two witnesses to
express themselves.' Moreover, luck is often a factor in determining
punishment. For instance, the reckless driver who has the misfortune of
killing someone suffers a more severe punishment than the one who
has the good fortune of being apprehended before injuring anyone."1
As for the lack of a principled way of distinguishing between the worth
of victims, the minority noted that our justice system already makes
such a distinction for punishment purposes. One is subject to the death
sentence for the assassination of the President or Vice-President, a
Congressperson, Cabinet official and various other public officials.'
While recognizing the potentially inflammatory nature of victim im-
pact evidence, the minority insisted that such evidence need not be
treated differently than other evidence. If certain victim impact evi-
dence is too inflammatory or otherwise objectionable-such as evi-
dence of the victim's race-Fourteenth Amendment due process re-
quires the judge to keep it from the jury.' -
The minority showed little sympathy for the defendant's difficulties in
rebutting victim impact evidence. The dissenters noted that althought
the defendant has the opportunity to rebut any evidence, he may, for
tactical reasons, choose not to do so."
47. Id, (White, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 517 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
49. See id. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also South Carolina v. Gathers, 490
U.S. 805, 817 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct.
2597 (1991).
50. Booth, 482 U.S. at 517-18 (White, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 517 n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 517 (White, J., dissenting). See also, Gathers, 490 U.S. at 821 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) ("It would indeed be improper for a prosecutor to urge that the death
penalty be imposed because of the race, religion, or political affiliation of the vic-
tim.") (emphasis omitted); Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2608.
54. Booth, 482 U.S. at 518 (White, J., dissenting). See also, Payne, 111 S. Ct. at
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Finally, the minority pointed out that "determinations of appropriate
sentencing considerations are 'peculiarly questions of legislative poli-
cy. '"6 When Booth was decided, victim impact statement statutes had
been adopted in at least thirty-six states.' By August 1987, at least for-
ty-seven states had such statutes." Deference to the legislature re-
quires their admissibility.
Between Booth and Payne, the Supreme Court considered, for the
second time, the appropriateness of victim impact evidence in the sen-
tencing phase of a capital trial.' In South Carolina v. Gathers,' Gath-
ers was convicted of murder and first degree sexual misconduct.'
Gathers and three friends encountered the victim, Haynes, sitting on a
bench in a park.6 Haynes had a history of mental problems. He
"referred to himself as 'Reverend Minister'... [and] would 'tal[k] to
people all the time about the Lord.'"' When Haynes refused to carry
on a conversation with Gathers and his cohorts, Gathers and two others
assaulted him, breaking a bottle over his head.' Gathers continued to
beat the victim with an umbrella, and then sexually assaulted him,
forcing the umbrella up his anus. Gathers left the scene, only to return
shortly thereafter, whereupon he stabbed the victim to death.'
2607 ("The mere fact that for tactical reasons it might not be prudent for the de-
fense to rebut victim impact evidence makes the case no different than others in
which a party is faced with this sort of dilemma.").
55. Booth, 482 U.S. at 515 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 176 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
56. Sep, e.g., Booth, 482 U.S. at 509 n.12 (stating that at least 36 states permit the
use of victim impact statements in some contexts).
57. Young, supra note 2, at 65.
58. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Ten-
nessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). Prior to Gathers, the Court decided Mills v. Maryland,
486 U.S. 367 (1988), vacating a death sentence on grounds unrelated to the victim
evidence issue. Id. at 369. Nevertheless, the issue was raised because a victim impact
statement was introduced. The victim impact statement was short, just three para-
graphs, and contained only evidence of the victim's personal history and characteris-
tics. Id, at 396-97 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Writing for the dissent, Justice
Rehnquist stated that he continued to believe Booth was wrongly decided. Id. at 397
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The newly appointed Justice Kennedy joined the dissent,
signalling the eventual demise of Booth.
59. 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
60. Id. at 807-08.
61. Id. at 806-07.
62. Id. at 807.
63. Id.
64. Id.
During the closing argument at sentencing, the prosecutor made sev-
eral remarks about the personal characteristics of the victim. The jury
subsequently sentenced Gathers to death.' The Supreme Court of
South Carolina, however, found that the prosecutor's "extensive com-
ments to the jury regarding the victim's character were unnecessary to
an understanding of the circumstances of the crime," and "conveyed the
suggestion appellant deserved a death sentence because the victim was
a religious man and a registered voter."' The court reversed Gathers'
death sentence and remanded for a new sentence hearing.'
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari, and in
another five-to-four decision,' affirmed. In so doing, the Court con-
firmed its holding in Booth that evidence of a victim's personal charac-
teristics is impermissible in capital sentencing. The Court went one step
further, however, by extending Booth to prosecutorial statements about
the victim's personal qualities.'
Just two years later, having invited the State to renew the chal-
lenge," the Court once again considered the admissibility of victim
impact evidence in capital sentencing in Payne v. Tennessee." In
Payne, as in Booth and Gathers, the Court confronted a brutal murder.
Payne had entered the apartment of a twenty-eight-year-old mother and
her children, ages two and three. When the woman rebuffed Payne's
65. Id, at 806.
66. State v. Gathers, 369 S.E.2d 140, 144 (S.C. 1988).
67. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810.
68. By the time of Gathers, Justice Powell, who had delivered the majority opinion
in Booth, had been replaced by Justice Kennedy. In Gathers, Kennedy joined Justices
O'Connor and Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissent. But Justice White, who
had written a dissent in Booth, sided with the majority in Gathers, apparently out of
respect for precedent In his concurring opinion, White stated, unless Booth "is to be
overruled, the judgment below must be affirmed." Gathers, 490 U.S. at 812 (White, J.,
concurring).
Justice O'Connor argued that there was no need to overrule the Booth decision
because its holding could be limited to statements about harm to the victim's family.
Id. at 812-13 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In the instant case, at issue were prosecutori-
al comments about the victim himself. Id. at 814 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She was
willing, however, to overrule Booth if necessary. Id. at 813-14 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting).
Justice Scalia rejected any attempt to distinguish between statements made about
the victim's personal characteristics and those relating to the harm to the victim's
family or society. Id. at 823-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He too was willing to overrule
Booth. Id. at 824 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 811-12.
70. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2691 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). During the interim between Gathers and Payne, the
Court passed up an opportunity to reconsider Booth by denying certiorari in Ohio v.
Huertas, 111 S. Ct. 805 (1991) (per curiam).
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sexual advances, Payne killed her and her daughter, repeatedly stabbing
them with a butcher knife.' The son, also stabbed, survived.' Payne
was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of
assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree.'
During the sentencing phase, the victim's mother testified that the
surviving son missed his mother and sister and cried for them.' In
calling for the death penalty, the prosecutor repeatedly referred to the con-
tinuing effects of the crime on the boy and the surviving family.' The
jury sentenced Payne to death on each of the murder counts and to
thirty years in prison for assault." The Supreme Court of Tennessee
affirmed the conviction and sentence.' The Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States granted certiorari.'
With Booth's four minority justices now in the majority,' the Court
overruled Booth and Gathers," primarily for the reasons stated in the
Booth disents: (i) punishment is a function of subjective guilt and ob-
jective harm,' (ii) fairness requires the State be permitted to introduce
victim impact evidence to offset the defendant's unrestricted mitigating
evidence:,' (iii) difficulty in rebutting victim evidence is simply one of
many tactical concerns," and (iv) deference to the legislature requires
admission of victim impact evidence.' In contesting the claim that evi-
dence of the victim's personal characteristics would lead to imposition
of the death penalty based on the relative worth of the victim, the
Payne majority offered a defense not raised in Booth. Victim impact
evidence, "as a general matter," is "not offered to encourage compara-
72. Paynw, 111 S. Ct. at 2601-02.
73. Id. at 2602.
74. Id at 2601.
75. Id. at 2603.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2601.
78. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10 (Tenn. 1990) (holding that the prosecutor's
discussion of son's mental suffering did not violate either Booth or Gathers).
79. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct 1031 (1991) (granting writ of certiorari and spe-
cifically requesting parties to brief whether Booth and Gathers should be overruled).
80. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, and was joined by
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and White, the last having apparently
overcome his qualms about overruling Booth. I&. at 2601.
81. Id. at 2611.
82. Id. at 260506.
83. Id. at 2607-09.
84. Id. at 2607.
85. Ld. at 2607-08.
tive judgements" of social worth of victims. Rather, its purpose is to
show each victim's "uniqueness as an individual human being."'
Writing now in dissent, Justices Marshall and Stevens not only reiter-
ated previous positions but raised new arguments and objections. To
the Payne majority's contention that harm has long been a relevant fac-
tor in fixing punishment, Marshall countered that "[njothing in Booth or
Gathers... conflicts with this unremarkable observation. "" At issue is
simply one particular kind of harm (that associated with the victim's
personal characteristics)" in one particular context (the sentencing
phase of a capital trial). As noted in Booth, the Court has long recog-
nized that death is a punishment different from all others.'
Justice Stevens observed that while harm is relevant in determining
punishment, such harm is limited to that which is foreseeable or "clear-
ly identified in advance of the crime by the legislature as a class of
harm that should in every case result in more severe punishment."' By
not providing guidance as to how much or what kind of harm is suffi-
cient to tip the balance from life in prison to capital punishment, the
majority's decision allows the jury or trial judge to consider victim im-
pact on an ad hoc and post hoc basis. Such unguided discretion in-
creases the likelihood of inconsistent judgments and "conflicts with the
principle central to our capital punishment jurisprudence that, 'where
discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the
determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that
discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the
risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.' "'
Requiring harm to be foreseeable or legislatively defined in advance
also provides the basis for Stevens' response to White's argument in
Booth that our legal system does in fact recognize the different worth
of individuals in meting out punishment. White had pointed out that
statutes authorize the death penalty for the assassination of the Presi-
dent, Vice President and various other public officials.' But such statu-
tory provisions, Stevens noted, provide the potential offender with no-
86. Id. at 2607.
87. Id. at 2620 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. By interpreting Booth and Gathers narrowly as rejecting only evidence about
the victim's personal characteristics, Justice Marshall appears to be abandoning the
fight against evidence of impact on the victim's family. See id,
89. Booth, 482 U.S. at 509 n.12 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
303-05 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ.)). For a discussion of
why death is different, see infra notes 155-9 and accompanying text.
90. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2629 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2628 (Stevens,' J., dissenting) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
189 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.)).
92. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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tice of the legislatively determined punishment corresponding to his
intended crime.' Thus, the imposition of the death penalty in such cas-
es is not merely the ad hoc and post hoc judgment of the jury or trial
judge.
Stevens also dismissed the majority's contention that evidence of the
victim's personal characteristics is designed, not to demonstrate the
comparative social worth of the victim, but to show the jury that the
defendant is a unique individual.' Justice Souter observed in his con-
curring opinion that "every defendant knows, if endowed with the men-
tal competence for criminal responsibility, that the life he will take by
his honcidal behavior is that of a unique person, like himself, and that
the person who will be killed probably has close associates, 'survivors,'
who will suffer harms and deprivations from the victim's death."' But
if every defendant knows this, Stevens replied, then so surely does ev-
ery juror and trial judge." Introduction of such evidence is superflu-
ous, serving only the illicit purpose of inflaming the jury.
Both Marshall and Stevens criticized the majority for reducing the
Booth Court's procedural concerns to a mere tactical worry. Marshall
and Stevens were not concerned with the defendant's strategic problem
of rebutting victim evidence; rather, they believed that victim impact
evidence creates an unacceptable risk of arbitrariness. The probative
value of victim evidence is simply outweighed by its prejudicial effect
due to its "inherent capacity to draw the jury's attention away from the
character of the defendant and the circumstances of the crime.
" 97
The dissenters next took aim at the Payne majority's argument that
fairness requires the admission of victim impact evidence to offset the
unrestricted mitigating evidence of the defendant. Justice Marshall as-
serted that the majority's position simply begs the question. To deter-
mine what evidence may be fairly introduced, one must first determine
what evidence is permissible in light of the substantive standards of the
Eighth Amendment." Stevens deemed the majority's argument a "clas-
sic non sequitur."9 Although it is true that the defendant is able to in-
troduce evidence about his character, why should that entitle the State
93. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2628 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 2630 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 2615 (Souter, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 2630 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 2620 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 2629-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 2621 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 2627 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
to respond with similar evidence about the victim? "The victim is not
on trial; her character, whether good or bad, cannot therefore consti-
tute either an aggravating or mitigating circumstance.""°
Further, Stevens argued, the procedures are already fair. Just as the
defendant cannot introduce irrelevant evidence about the immoral char-
acter or personal shortcomings of the victim, neither can the State offer
irrelevant evidence about the victim's moral character and personal
qualities.
[I]f a defendant, who had murdered a convenience store clerk in cold blood in the
course of an armed robbery, offered evidence unknown to him at the time of the
crime about the immoral character of his victim, all would recognize immediately
that the evidence was irrelevant and inadmissable. Evenhanded justice requires
that the same constraint be imposed on the advocate of the death penalty."'
The State is treated fairly in that it is given an opportunity to rebut any
mitigating evidence that the defendant introduces."
Finally, and more fundamentally, Stevens pointed out that the premise
that there should be an "even-handed balance between the State and the
defendant is... incorrect. The Constitution grants certain rights to the
criminal defendant and imposes special limitations on the State designed
to protect the individual from overreaching by the disproportionately
powerful State."'" The State, for instance, must prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt."° Similarly, rules of evidence are weighted in the
defendant's favor. The prosecution is not permitted to "introduce evi-
dence of the defendant's character to prove his propensity to commit a
crime, but the defendant can introduce such evidence to show his law-
abiding nature."'
In Stevens' view, the majority's overruling of Booth and Gathers re-
flects not the force of reason and new argument, but the "current popu-
larity of capital punishment in a crime-ridden society," and the political
appeal and strength of the victims' rights movement."° Marshall, for his
part, noted that "[n]either the law nor the facts supporting Booth and
Gathers underwent any change in the last four years. Only the personnel
of this Court did.""°7 "Power," he concluded, "not reason, is the new cur-
rency of this Court's decisionmaking.""
Of course, the reasonableness of the Payne Court's ruling depends in
100. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 2626 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 2627 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 2627-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing FED. R. EviD. 404(a)).
106. Id. at 2631 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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no small measure on the justifiability of the underlying substantive claim.
If, as the Payne, Court claims, victim harm is a morally relevant factor in
meting out punishment, then the procedural question of whether the
introduction of victim impact evidence is "unduly" inflammatory will be
answered, in most instances, in the negative." An inflamed jury is pre-
cisely what is required: the brutal details of the murder of an elderly cou-
ple, a solitary and helpless man, or a mother and her child ought to in-
cite moral indignation in the jury. Similarly, if harm is relevant, then
Payne supporters have a ready response to the Booth Court's concern
that moral principles provide no justification for distinguishing between
defendants whose victims are deemed socially worthy and those whose
victims are judged less worthy. The factor that distinguishes the one
from the other is simply the harm caused."'
Conversely, if victim harm-or perhaps only unforeseen and
unforseeable victim harm-is irrelevant, then the Payne Court's argu-
ment that fairness requires evidence about such harm to the victim and
his family is simply a nonstarter. As for deference to the legislature, the
Court's capital punishment jurisprudence requires the death penalty be
imposed on the basis of "rational criteria" and be proportionate to the
offense."' If such information is morally irrelevant, then it can hardly
provide a rational and proportionate basis for capital punishment. By the
Court's own lights, such information would be constitutionally impermis-
sible, and as acknowledged in Payne, "state laws respecting crimes, pun-
ishments, and criminal procedure are of course subject to the overriding
provisions of the United States Constitution.""'
Thus, little progress can be made on the procedural issues without
first coming to grips with the substantive issue."' Part II lays the ground-
109. Undoubtedly, all aggravating evidence inflames the jury. See Susan A. Jump,
Note, Booth v. Maryland: Admissibility of Victim Impact Statements During Sentenc-
ing Phase qf Capital Murder Trials, 21 GA. L REV. 1191, 1212 (1987). But even the
Payne court recognized that not all potentially inflammatory facts about the victim
are constitutionally admissible. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2608-09.
110. Murphy, supra note 9, at 1316. Whether this response is sufficient to meet a
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge is another issue, and beyond the
scope of this article. See Willmott, supra note 13.
111. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305-06 (1987).
112. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607.
113. This is not to say that none of the procedural disputes are capable of indepen-
dent resolution. For instance, Justice Marshall is correct in pointing out that the
Payne Court's fairness argument begs the substantive question. Id. at 2621 n.1 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). But even accepting the substantive penal theory of the Payne
work for an assessment of the particular substantive claim in Payne by
examining the more general substantive penal theory underlying the
Payne Court's reasoning.
II. THE PENAL THEORY OF PAYNE
Both the Booth and the Payne Courts agree that punishment is to be
proportionate to desert. They disagree, however, over the proper scope
of desert.
The Booth majority seeks to limit the scope of desert by imposing a
mens rea requirement."' One deserves to be punished for the acts and
the consequences of those acts for which one has the requisite mental
state. Conversely, one does not deserve to be punished for acts or conse-
quences for which one does not possess the proper mens rea
The focus of a victim impact statement... is not on the defendant, but on the
character and reputation of the victim and... his family. These factors may be
wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular defendant. As our cases
have shown, the defendant often will not know the victim, and therefore will have
no knowledge about the existence or characteristics of the victim's family. More-
over, defendants rarely select their victims based on whether the murder will have
an effect on anyone other than the person murdered. Allowing the jury to rely on
a victim impact statement therefore could result in imposing the death sentence
because of factors about which the defendant was unaware, and that were irrele-
Court, Justice Stevens appears to have the better of the argument. As a procedural
matter, the criminal process does not afford the State an even-handed balance. I&l at
2627 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Further, the Payne Court never adequately addressed the Booth Court's argument
that admission of victim impact evidence would introduce an element of luck, render-
ing the imposition of the death sentence impermissibly arbitrary and capricious.
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504-05 (1987). Justices White and Scalia did point
out that luck inevitably does enter the process, and that the defendant's misfortune
in having murdered a victim with an eloquent family is no greater than the misfor-
tune the defendant encounters in facing a particularly eloquent prosecutor or witness.
Id. at 517-18 (White, J., dissenting). Commentators have noted, however, that the
ineradicable element of luck in the criminal process provides no moral justification
for introducing additional elements of chance. See Jeffrey Stoner, Comment, Constitu-
tional Law--Cruel and Unusual Punishment--Eighth Amendment Prohibits Introduc-
tion of Victim Impact Evidence at Sentencing Phase of Capital Murder Trial. Booth
v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987); Another View, 19 RuTGEFRs L J. 1175, 1184
(1988); Howard, supra note 7, -at 718 n.104.
Arguably, however, even this procedural dispute turns on a substantive moral
one: namely, whether the injustice of the additional element of luck is outweighed by
an enhancement in justice, if any, from the inclusion of harm in the punishment
calculus.
114. Kant would impose an intent requirement on criminal punishment See supra
note 4 and accompanying text. By contrast, the Court endorses a lower mens rea stan-
dard-recklessness-at least with respect to the harm of taking another life. See
iqlfra notes 129-39 and accompanying text.
[VoL 20: 26, 1992] A Philosophical Critique of Payne v. Tennessee
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
vant to the decision to kill."
In contrast, the Payne Court widens the scope of desert. One may be
punished not only for acts and consequences for which one possesses
"subjective guilt,""' but also for all the harmful consequences of one's
acts, regardless of one's subjective mental state or mens rea with respect
to these consequences. Harm is "'a measure of the seriousness of the
offense and therefore.., a standard for determining the severity of the
sentence [to be] meted out.'" "7 Punishment, therefore, is a function of
both subjective guilt and objective harm."'
115. Booth, 482 U.S. at 504-05.
116. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605-06.
117. Id at 2606 (quoting STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT. THE SEN-
TENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 56 (1988)).
118. The Payne Court referred to the subjective element of desert as guilt or
blameworthiness. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605. Guilt and blameworthiness are often used
interchangeably with culpability and responsibility. Justice Scalia, however, had previ-
ously distinguished between moral guilt and responsibility: "If a bank robber aims his
gun at a guard, pulls the trigger, and kills his target, he may be put to death. If the
gun unexpectedly misfires, he may not. His moral guilt in both cases is identical, but
his responsibility in the former is greater." Booth, 482 U.S. at 519 (Scalia J., dissent-
ing). Similarly, Justice O'Connor used the term "culpability" to encompass harm, stat-
ing that "one essential factor in determining the defendant's culpability is the extent
of the harm caused." South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 818 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
Desert, guilt, blameworthiness, culpability and responsibility can be and are used
in more than one way. Construed narrowly, they can be limited to only intentional
acts (or acts for which one has the requisite mens rea, if lower than intent). More
broadly, one can speak of someone being guilty of causing great harm, even if not
intended and unforeseen. Such a person could be blamed, and held responsible. Thus,
Scalia is not wrong in his use of responsibility; nor has O'Connor abused the English
language in using culpability to refer to harm.
Nevertheless, the danger of speaking of harm in terms of responsibility and
culpability--words often, if not usually, associated with intention and volition-is that
it threatens to cloud the distinction between mens rea-based punishment and conse-
quence-based punishment. To be sure, this was not Scalia's intent in his Booth dis-
sent. Having distinguished between moral guilt and responsibility, he argued that "the
principle upon which the Court's opinion rests--that the imposition of capital punish-
ment is to be determined solely on the basis of moral guilt -- does not exist, neither
in the text of the Constitution, nor in the historical practices of our society, nor even
in the opinions of this Court." Booth, 482 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Both
one's mental state and the harmful consequences of one's acts must be considered in
meting out punishment.
In Payne, the Court takes pains to distinguish between guilt (blameworthiness)
and objective harm. Rather than attempting to argue that harmful consequences are
part of one's responsibility or guilt, the Court squarely faces the mens rea-conse-
The issue, moreover, is not whether the Payne Court's consequence-
based theory is best labelled retributivist or utilitarian."' That will de-
pend on how one defines these terms, and they have been defined in
more than one way." One way to distinguish the two is on the basis of
their temporal focus: retributivism is retrospective, while utilitarianism is
prospective." Judged by the criterion of temporal focus, both the
Booth and Payne majority are best characterized as retributivist.u Both
quence distinction, claimin g that both subjective guilt and objective harm are relevant
factors in determining the appropriate punishment Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605-06. But
see id. at 2615-16 (Souter, J., concurring), discussed infra notes 125-38 and accompa-
nying text.
119. The Court has declared that punishment that does not contribute to either de-
terrence or retribution "is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition
of pain and suffering,' and hence an unconstitutional punishment." Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality
opinion of White, J.)).
120. Compare JOEL FEINBERG & HYmAN GROSS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 628 (4th ed.
1991) with J.L Mackie, Retributivism: A Test for Ethical Objectivity, in PHILOSOPHY
OF LAw 679 (4th ed. 1991). As Feinberg and Gross note, some authors, Feinberg
being one, define utilitarianism very specifically, and then consider all non-utilitarian
theories retributivist See id. The more typical route is to first define retributivism,
usually in moralistic terms (punishment as one's just desert, proportional to one's
guilt, culpability, blameworthiness or personal responsibility), and then consider all
non-retributive theories utilitarian. l
121. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Ruies, 64 PHIL REV. 3, 5 (1955). Rawls,
however, attempts to reconcile retributivism with utilitarianism by distinguishing justi-
fication of the practice (or institution) of punishment and justification of a particular
act of punishment (within that practice or institution).
The temporal distinction works as follows. The retributivist determines when to
punish by looking back to a violation of the law; who to punish by looking back to
the person who violated the law; how much to punish by looking back to the guilt
of the person and the crime committed, but always in proportion to desert. Why is
one punished? Because one has committed a crime, and deserves to be punished.
Again, the retributivist looks backward.
Conversely, the utilitarian determines when to punish by looking forward to the
benefit of punishment, that is, when the gains of punishing outweigh the costs. This
is the great trump card of utilitarians against retributivists who would punish past
wrongs even if nobody stood to gain in any way, shape or form. To determine who
to punish, the utilitarian again looks forward to the benefit to be derived from the
punishment. In theory, the person punished could be innocent. A continuing embar-
rassment to utilitarians, this is the trump card of the retributivist who punishes only
those who have violated the law. To determine how much to punish, the utilitarian
calculates what punishment is sufficient to produce the maximum social benefit.
Maximization of social welfare is, after all, why the utilitarian punishes.
122. Other criteria have been suggested. Feinberg suggests three:
1. Guilt is a necessary condition for justified punishment.
2. Guilt is a sufficient condition ("irrespective of consequences") for justified
punishment.
3. The proper amount of punishment to be inflicted upon the ... guilty
offender is that amount which fits, matches, or is proportionate to the ...
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determine when to punish by looking back to a violation of law, namely,
murder. Both determine whom to punish by looking back to those who
commit the murder. Neither would punish an innocent party simply for
utilitarian gains. Both would punish the murderer because he is guilty
and deserves it, and both claim that the murderer is to be punished pro-
portionately to desert. The two theories differ over whether to look back
to only the mental state of the murderer or to both the mental state and
harmful consequences to determine desert.
A priori, there is no reason to limit desert, and hence retributive pun-
ishment, to subjective guilt defined in terms of some mental state. Little
is gained by scouring the historical record to verify that Kant or anyone
else has interpreted retributivism in a particular way." Interpretations
gravity of the offense.
FEINBERG & GROSS, supra note 120, at 647. See also Michael S. Moore, The Moral
Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 180 (1987).
"The distinctive aspect of retributivism is that the moral desert of an offender is a
sufficient reason to punish him or her." Id. (emphasis in original). Even according to
Feinberg's more elaborate criteria, the Court's position in Payne 'must be considered
retributivist.
However, one might claim that the essential aspect of retributivism is that punish-
ment is a morally necessary consequence of guilt. One who is guilty must be punished.
On this score, the Court's position would not be retributivist because it recognizes the
right of other government actors to grant pardons and the right of states not to im-
pose capital punishment on the basis of victim harm. But to define retributivism in this
way would be odd. Surely, other moral considerations may outweigh the state's duty to
punish, assuming there is such a duty.
123. Nor will it suffice to appeal to the ordinary language usage of the term. See
supra note 118.
In his insightful analysis of the Supreme Court's penal theory in Booth, Richard
Murphy defines retributivism narrowly. Retributivism is Kantian retributivism, with
punishment scaled to moral culpability defined in terms of one's intentions. Murphy,
supra note 9, at 1308. In contrast, punishment based on (unintended) consequences is
"vengeance . .. a utilitarian theory ... antithetical to retributi[vism] in the sense of
desert for culpability." ld.
Murphy recognizes, however, that some claim "that an individual's moral cul-
pability includes responsibility for the harm caused. It is a common belief that an
offender should not complain when foreseeable results come about and he is pun-
ished for them." Id. Despite the currency of this view, Murphy is adamant in his
rejection: "[iW]hatever theory exists to justify this belief, it is not retribution." Id. And
indeed, if retributivism is defined narrowly in terms of subjective intent, Murphy is
right, by definition. Under Murphy's analysis, the Booth majority's position would not
be retributivist because its requisite mens rea for punishment is not intent, but the
lower standard of recklessness. See infra notes 129-39 and accompanying text.
If, on the other hand, retributivism is defined in terms of retrospective focus, or
can change, and there can be more than one interpretation. This article
refers to the Booth Court's position as mens rea retributivism and to the
Payne Court's as consequentialist retributivism." The former includes
Kantian intent-based theories as well as theories which set a lower mens
rea standard. The latter allows consideration of all harmful consequenc-
es, whether intentional, unforeseen or unforeseeable. But if one does not
want to call the Payne Court view retributivist, fine. One may label the
positions as one fancies so long as what is signified is clear. The real
issue is not what we call the Court's position, but whether it can be jus-
tified morally, politically, and legally.
Justice Souter attempts to sidestep the central substantive issue of
whether the better view imposes a mens rea requirement or encompasses
all harmful consequences. He argues that even on the minority's mens
rea theory of retributivism, evidence about victim harm is admissible
because every murderer possesses the requisite mens rea with respect to
such harm.
Murder has foreseeable consequences. When it happens, it is always to distinct
individuals, and after it happens other victims are left behind. Every defendant
knows, if endowed with the mental competence for criminal responsibility, that
the life he will take by his homicidal behavior is that of a unique person, like
himself, and that the person to be killed probably has close associates, "survi-
vors," who will suffer harms and deprivations from the victim's death .... The
fact that the defendant may not know the details of a victim's life and characteris-
tics, or the exact identities and needs of those who may survive, should not in any
way obscure the further facts that death is always to a "unique" individual, and
harm to some group of survivors is a consequence of a successful homicidal act
so foreseeable as to be virtually inevitable.
That foreseeability of the killing's consequences imbues them with direct moral
relevance, and evidence of the specific harm caused when a homicidal risk is
realized is nothing more than evidence of the risk that the defendant originally
chose to run despite the kinds of consequences that were obviously foresee-
able."3
Souter's remarks emphasize the foreseeability of harm to the victim
and his community. Foreseeability implies a negligence standard. Al-
though mens rea is often loosely used to include negligence,"2 it literal-
in terms of mens rea less than intent, or even simply in terms of just or proportional
desert, then both the Booth and Payne Courts' penal theory may be characterized as
retributivist.
124. For a somewhat similar distinction, see Phillip A. Talbert, Comment, The Rele-
vance of Victim Impact Statements to the Criminal Sentencing Decision, 36 UCLA L
REV. 199, 212-14 (1988). Talbert, however, refers to what I have called mens rea
retributivism as "moral retribution" and labels consequentialist. retribution as "social
retribution."
125. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. at 2615-16 (Souter, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
126. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 212 (2d ed. 1986).
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ly refers to a guilty mind, connoting a subjective awareness which is not
an element of negligence. Negligence is an objective standard.2 ' Fore-
seeability is measured not by the particular defendant but by the stan-
dard of a reasonable person similarly situated."
As Souter himself notes, the Booth majority rejects a foreseeability-
negligence standard for capital crimes." The Booth Court requires, at
minimum, subjective awareness of the probable consequences. In Tison
v. Arizona,' a felony murder case, the defendants did not themselves
kill or intend that a killing take place. Nevertheless, the Court upheld
capital punishment upon finding the "culpable mental state of reckless
indifference to human life."' Acknowledging Tison, the Booth majority
stated that the "defendant's degree of knowledge of the probable conse-
quences of his actions may increase his moral culpability." " Thus, at
least with felony murder homicides involving extreme indifference to life,
the Booth majority appeared willing to set the mens rea level as low as
recklessness.' Recklessness is a higher standard than negligence,'3
127. Some courts have distinguished between criminal and tort negligence, requiring
subjective awareness of the risk for the former. See id. at 236-37. The motivation
would appear to be the belief that to deserve criminal punishment, one must possess
some subjective culpability.
128. Id. at 233, 235.
129. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2615 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Booth v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987)).
130. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
131. Id. at 151. It is debatable whether Tison can be reconciled with Enmund, a
prior felony murder case where the Court held that the death penalty is inherently
disproportionate when imposed on one who "does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or
intend that a killing take place." Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982). The
Tison court attempted to distinguish Enmund by claiming that Enmund only applied
to the minor actor who had no culpable mental state. Tison, 481 U.S. at 149-52.
132. Booth, 482 U.S. at 505.
133. The Booth Court's position on harmful consequences that accompany the harm
of kdlling another person is not entirely clear. Nothing in Booth or Tison would pre-
vent the Court from allowing the lower recklessness standard with respect to the
underlying killing and yet require a higher mens rea-intent, purpose or knowl-
edge-with respect to accompanying victim harm. This would make sense because
the harm of the killing is much greater than the accompanying harm; hence, one
should pay greater heed to the risk of killing. Furthermore, the potential punishment,
execution, is proportionately much greater vis-&-vis the accompanying harm than it is
vis-h-vis the harm of the killing. Given the severity of the punishment, one might
require a higher mens rea with respect to the lesser harm.
134. Dissenting in Payne, Justice Stevens hinted that he might be willing to set the
mens rea standard at negligence. He noted that "there is a rational correlation be-
tween moral culpability and foreseeable harm caused by criminal conduct," and that
and is consistent with the principle that the punishment should reflect
the defendant's subjective guilt, as defined in terms of some degree of
mental culpability."' Indeed, the Payne Court, by contrasting the
defendant's subjective guilt with objective harm, also appears to draw
the mens rea line at recklessness.
In any event, even were foreseeability sufficient to establish the requi-
site mens rea, one would still have to specify what must be foreseeable.
To be distinguished is the general harm that accompanies every murder
(for which one is already subject to a severe punishment) and the specif-
ic harm to the particular victim (on the basis of which the jury or trial
judge imposes the death penalty)." In every murder, there is always
harm to a unique individual, and in many cases to the survivors, should
there be any. This much, it is true, is known and foreseeable to all."'
However, one is not subject to capital punishment for the generic harm
of murder. If such were the case, then capital punishment would be ap-
propriate for every murderer. Rather, one is punished for consequences
of a very specific sort, measured by the peculiar personal characteristics
of the victim and the specific impact on his family. This is what distin-
guishes the fate of two murderers, each of whom killed with the same
mens rea culpability, and inflicted the same general harm inflicted on the
victim, the victim's survivors and society. One gets a life sentence, the
other capital punishment, simply because one victim is socially valuable
and belongs to a particular community (a grieving, well-spoken, loving
family) while the other victim is not. Therefore, foreseeability of the
the legislature may properly consider such harm in defining the offense and setting
the punishment. Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2628 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). This suggests that he might lower the requisite mens rea standard to negligence
and punish for foreseeable consequences. But he hastens to point out that the specif-
ic harm must be legislatively defined in advance. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Further,
he claimed there is no authority for the majority's view that unforeseeable and indi-
rect harms to the victim and his family may be considered by the capital sentencer
on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 2628-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. The felony murder rule has been widely criticized precisely because it subjects
one to severe punishment, even execution, on the basis of unintended and perhaps
unforeseen and unforeseeable results. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Pun-
ishmen: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law,
122 U. PA. L REv. 1497, 1542-43 (1974) (noting actual risk of felony resulting in
homicide is very low). See also, MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2 cmt. 4 (Tentative Draft
No. 9, 1959). Many states have limited the felony murder rule. See LAFAVE & SCorr,
supra note 126, at 623.
138. See Howard, supra note 7, at 714.
137. As Stevens points out, "[E]very juror and trial judge knows this much as well."
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2630 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus if the only purpose of victim
impact evidence is to bring home the truth about this general harm, the point is
already well taken. Introducing evidence to that effect then runs the risk of prejudic-
ing the jury for no gain.
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general harm that accompanies every murder does not provide the requi-
site mental culpability for capital punishment. If capital punishment is to
be imposed on the basis of specific harm, one must have the proper
mental state with respect to that harm."
Further, this argument applies to all mens rea standards: foreseeability,
recklessness, knowledge or intent. For example, one could modify Jus-
tice Souter's argument to meet the Booth majority's recklessness stan-
dard. Victims generally have families; families generally will be harmed
by the crime; the risk of causing victim harm is therefore .substantial;
such a risk is clearly unjustified (how could any risk of harm resulting
from the murder of an innocent person be justified?); all defendants
know this; therefore any murder is reckless. But reconstructing the ar-
gument in this way is futile. The defendant must still be reckless with
respect to the particular harm. He must be subjectively aware that his
victim possesses the kinds of personal characteristics and family rela-
tions that a jury or sentencing judge will hold dear. The defendant must
then consciously disregard the risk that his victim will be one that the
jury or judge will find sympathetic.
Not all victims have families, however. Even those who do often do
not have loving ones that are able to articulate their anger and grief to a
jury. Sometimes the defendant may even have reason to believe the vic-
tim does not have a family or that the family will not be adversely affect-
ed. In short, there is not always a substantial risk of causing the particu-
lar harm.
But even if the risk of killing someone with the right kind of family
were substantial, the defendant would also have to be subjectively aware
of this risk and consciously disregard it in order to be reckless. As the
Booth Court noted, most defendants do not murder with an eye to the
particular characteristics of the victim and the potential harm to the
family.'" The particular harm to the victim's family might never even
have crossed the defendant's mind. Thus, many defendants will never
have been subjectively aware of the particular risk, and that they reflect-
ed on the risk and consciously disregarded it is even less likely.
Moving up the mens rea ladder, Souter's argument, even modified, will
fail if the proper mens rea is neither foreseeability nor recklessness, but
138. If one does have the requisite mens rea (at least recklessness for the Booth
Court) then the harmful consequences constitute part of the circumstances of the
crime and are admissible, even under Booth.
139. Booth, 482 U.S. at 504-05.
intent. Most murderers simply do not intend harm to the victim's family,
much less the particular harm at issue in Payne.
There are then two main issues. The first is the scope of desert, and
whether mens rea is required at all. The second is what the proper mens
rea standard should be. The Payne Court rejects a mens rea requirement;
Payne, in effect, imposes strict liability with respect to victim harm.
Justice Souter sides with the Payne majority in rejecting mens rea in the
literal sense of a subjectively guilty mind, settling instead for the objec-
tive standard of negligence and foreseeability-but he believes all defen-
dants meet that standard. The Booth majority requires some subjective
awareness-at minimum, recklessness. I argue for intent.
But even were the Booth majority to adopt Souter's lower foreseeabili-
ty standard, it would still be at odds with the Payne Court as long as in
some instances the specific harm to the victim and his family was not
foreseeable. While the Booth majority would consider such unforeseeable
harm irrelevant, the Payne Court would include it in the punishment
calculus, and stand ready to dole out capital punishment on that basis.
Thus, despite Justice Souter's efforts, the substantive dispute between
the Booth and Payne Courts is alive and well, and must be addressed.
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE THESIS OF PAYNE
The Payne Court must justify the following. Defendant one (Dl) mur-
ders victim one (Vi), a wealthy doctor with a loving family who grieves
for him. D1 did not know that V1 was a wealthy doctor with a loving
family. Neither Vl's personal characteristics nor the impact on Vl's fami-
ly influenced DI's intention or motive in killing VI, nor were they fore-
seeable. Di is sentenced to death. Defendant two (D2) murders victim
two (V2) with the same knowledge and intent as Di. V2, however, is an
unemployed homeless person without a family who has fallen on hard
times. D2 is not given capital punishment but life in prison.
As the hypothetical illustrates, the issue in Payne is starkly drawn and
quite specific. To be justified is a particular punishment: capital punish-
ment based on harmful consequences, even if unforeseen and unforesee-
able, as measured by the personal characteristics of the victim and the
impact of the crime on the victim's family.
The hypothetical is sufficient to test the justifiability of Payne, which
sanctions the death penalty for unforeseen and unforeseeable conse-
quences. But to measure the distance between the strong thesis (intent is
required with respect to the harmful consequences for which one is giv-
en capital punishment) and the weak thesis (recklessness is sufficient), a
new defendant, D3, is needed. D3 is identical to Dl, and V3'identical to
V1, except D3 was aware of and consciously disregarded the risk of
causing harm based on V3's particular characteristics and family rela-
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tions. D3, like Dl, is sentenced to death. D2, as before, is given life im-
prisonment." Just as Payne supporters must justify Dl's execution in
light of D2's lesser punishment, so must defenders of the weak thesis
justify D3's execution.
Having stated what must be justified, it is important to note what need
not be. Not at issue is the justifiability of capital punishment per se, or
the execution of intentional murderers."' In the preceding hypothetical
D1, D2 and D3 intentionally commit murder, but DI and D3 are sen-
tenced to death, D2 to life in prison. What distinguishes Dl and D3 from
D2 are the harmful consequences of their acts, and hence what must be
justified is the relevance of those consequences to capital punishment.
Also not at issue is the justifiability of non-capital punishment based
on harm, foreseen or unforeseen, to the victim and his family or other-
wise.'c The relevance of harm to capital punishment and to non-crimi-
nal or non-capital criminal punishment must be treated separately.
Undeniably, harm to the victim is a factor in the non-criminal tort
context. Courts regularly look to the personal characteristics of the vic-
tim and the impact on the family in calculating damages for lost earn-
ings, pain and suffering and so forth.'" Indeed, under the "eggshell
plaintiff" rule, one may be liable for even unforeseen and unforeseeable
harm if one acts negligently.'" But tort law is about monetary compen-
140. The complete hypothetical is as follows: D3 murders V3, a wealthy doctor with
a loving family who grieves for him. D3 was aware of and consciously disregarded
V3's personal characteristics and family relations. But neither V3's personal character-
istics nor the impact on V3's family were part of D3's intention or motive in killing
V3. D3 is sentenced to death.
141. Booth, Gathers and Payne were all guilty of intentional murders. Indeed, they
were all guilty of brutal murders, and perhaps for that alone deserve the death penal-
ty. Payne might well have been given the death penalty even had the Court prohibit-
ed victim impact evidence. The Tennessee Supreme Court had ruled that introduction
of the victim evidence was "harmless error." Given the brutality of the murder, the
court concluded that "the death penalty was the only rational punishment available."
State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (Tenn. 1990). But see Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2624 n.4
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining that the court should not have "automatically"
found harmless error, but instead should have assessed the impact of the error on
the sentencer's discretion). In any event, the appropriateness of capital punishment
for intentional murder where aggravating circumstances (other than harm to the
victim) are present is a separate issue.
142. Booth, 482 U.S. at 504, 507 n.10, 509 n.12.
143. See generaUy 1 MARILYN MINZER ET AL, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 422 (1992)
(pain and suffering); 8 id. §§ 110.10-.15 (economic loss).
144. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43, at
sation, not punishment (and certainly not capital punishment). Hence,
one might reasonably accept harm as relevant in the non-criminal tort
context and yet not in the criminal, or more narrowly, capital, con-
text."' It is one thing to ask one to pay for the consequences of one's
acts with money, and quite another to require one to pay with one's life.
The Payne Court noted that in the non-capital criminal context, harm
to the victim is considered in defining and grading an offense and in
choosing the punishment within the specified range." But the Payne
Court never offered an argument to justify the relevance of harm, and in
particular unforeseen harm in a capital context. Rather, it simply ob-
served that in practice, harm is a factor considered by legislatures and
courts, implying by analogy that harm, and the particular kind of harm
sanctioned by Payne, ought to be considered in capital contexts as well.
Two objections are possible. One could deny the analogy by distin-
guishing between the non-capital and capital contexts. Alternatively, one
could challenge the justifiability of non-capital punishment based on
harm, or at least on unforeseen and unforeseeable harm to the victim.
Take the latter first. Unforeseen and unforeseeable harm enters the
criminal process at several junctures. There are strict liability crimes for
which one is held liable despite the absence of any mens rea or even
negligence."" The justifiability of these crimes has been challenged pre-
cisely because they subject an actor wholly lacking in subjective guilt to
criminal punishment. Thus the Model Penal Code limits strict liability to
"violations" that are not considered "crimes" and that are punishable only
by fine, forfeiture, or other civil penalty.'" Whatever the label, the
presence of such offenses cannot, ipso facto, justify the imposition of the
death penalty for unforeseeable (or even reckless) harm.
To be sure, the defendants in Booth, Gathers and Payne are hardly
lacking in mens rea culpability. They all intentionally killed their victims.
They lack, however, intent (and Gathers in particular arguably even the
lower mens rea of recklessness) with respect to the specific victim harm
290-93 (6th ed. 1984).
145. See infra notes 192-98 and accompanying text.
146. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2605-06 (1991). The Model Penal Code,
for instance, takes harm as an aggravating circumstance in grading some crimes,
including burglary. Burglary is a felony of the third degree. However, if the offender
"purposely, knowingly or recklessly inflicts or attempts to inflict injury" in the pro-
cess, then it is a second degree felony. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2) (1985).
Here, the mens rea is recklessness, not foreseeability. But one may also be strictly
liable with respect to some aggravating circumstances. Many jurisdictions, for exam-
ple, grade larceny according to the value of the property taken. See LAFAVE & SCOTT,
supra note 126 at 718-24.
147. LAFAvE & Scor, supra note 126, at 242-50.
148. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(5) & explanatory note (1985).
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for which they may be executed under Payne. Thus, a closer analogy is
the criminal liability of a defendant who possesses the requisite mens rea
with respect to some crime (or element of a crime), but not to the spe-
cific result or harm. For instance, suppose A intentionally throws a rock
at a window, misses and hits B. Is A guilty of battery or only a lesser
crime against property? The general rule is that "intention to cause one
type of harm cannot serve as a substitute for the statutory or common-
law requirement of intention as to another type of harm.""4
Now suppose A intentionally punches B lightly in the mouth, but B is a
hemophiliaz who ends up bleeding to death."' It is true that some
courts would find A guilty of involuntary manslaughter, which is not a
capital offense, even though B's death from bleeding was entirely un-
foreseeable."' The Model Penal Code, however, finds this result objec-
tionable:
Whether the matter is viewed in relation to the just condemnation of the actor's
conduct or in relation to deterrence or correction, neither the terminology nor the
sanctionsi appropriate for homicide may fairly be applied when the fatality is for-
tuitous. The actor's conduct in causing or intending to cause injury is a crime...
and should be dealt with as such, i.e., as a crime defined in reference to the spe-
cific evil of bodily injury that it portends. [To do otherwise] serves no proper pur-
pose of the penal law and is abusive in itself."
Where the actual harm exceeds the harm intended, it is arguably better
to limit punishment to the offense defined by the intended harm."
Thus, it is debatable whether the consideration of unintended and
unforeseeable harm sanctioned in Payne is even justifiable in a non-capi-
tal criminal context. Consequently, appeal to the non-capital context
does not resolve the dispute. It simply changes the arena. At the very
least, some supporting argument is required.'u
But even if one could justify consideration of such harm in a non-capi-
tal context, one would still have to justify its relevance to capital punish-
ment. As the Booth majority noted, the Court has long recognized that
149. LAFAv' & SCOTT, supra note 126, at 273. The Model Penal Code reaches the
same conclusion for recklessness and negligence with respect to the type of harm.
MODEL PENAL, CODE § 2.03(3) (1985).
150. This example is drawn from LAFAVE & ScoTT, supm note 126, at 275.
151. Ld.
152. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.3 cmt. 8 (1980).
153. See LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 126, at 276.
154. Nor haes anything said thus far established the contrary thesis, namely, that
consideration of unintended or unforeseeable harm in the non-capital context is
tujustifiable.
death is qualitatively different from other punishments. Accordingly,
there is a need for greater reliability in capital sentencing." Death is
different because of its severity and irrevocability." Death is also differ-
ent because of the inherent value or sanctity of human life. 5' The value
of human life is captured in the notion of a "right to life." Even criminals
have certain rights, of which the right to life is surely the most funda-
mental. As will be argued in Part V, if the right to life is to be worth
anything, it must protect the individual against the State and others who
wish to take away that right for what are, at best, meager utilitarian
gains.15
Just as the relevance of harm in non-capital contexts is not at issue,
neither is the relevance of some harm in the capital context. There must,
of course, be some harm before there can be capital punishment. As the
Payne Court correctly observed, what distinguishes all murder from
attempted murder is simply the harm caused."6 D1 shoots to kill and
does so; D2 shoots to kill but misses. Both have the same intent but the
first may be executed while the latter may not. Ergo, harm is relevant to
capital punishment.'
The problems with this argument are twofold. It is true that harm is a
necessary condition for capital punishment. That much may be conced-
ed."2 Not any harm will suffice, however. For there to be capital pun-
ishment, there must first be a particular kind of harm: the death of an-
155. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. Murphy points out that reliability is
an issue primarily for the guilt phase of the trial. One must ensure that only the
guilty are punished. In contrast, the Booth Court would prohibit victim impact evi-
dence during the sentencing phase "even if factually correct." Murphy, supra note 9,
at 1332 (emphasis in original). But such evidence, even if factually reliable, may not
produce reliable sentences because of its inflammatory nature-as Murphy himself is
forced to concede. Id. at 1331-32.
156. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens J., concurring and dis-
senting).
157. See infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
158. See SHELDON KRANTZ, THE LAW OF CORRECTION AND PRISONER'S RIGHTS 292-537
(3d ed. 1986).
159. See infra notes 220-40 and accompanying text.
160. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. at 2597, 2605 (1991) (quoting Booth v. Mary-
land, 482 U.S. 496, 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). See also Murphy, supra note 9, at
1325.
161. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605.
162. Note that this would not be conceded by those who do not want to distin-
guish between attempt and completed crimes. See, e.g., R. Parker, Blame, Punish-
ment, and the Role of Result, 21 Am. PHIL Q. 1-11 (1984) (arguing that blameworthi-
ness and hence punishment is to be determined on the basis of the risk of harm the
conduct creates). See also, MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05 (1985) (providing that attempt-
ed crimes, other than those of first degree felonies, receive the same punishment as
completed crimes).
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other. ' But just because the harm from killing another may be relevant
to capital punishment, that does not mean that other kinds of harm are
also relevant.
Further, while the harm from killing another is a necessary condition
for capital punishment, it is not sufficient. Manslaughter and negligent
homicide both result in death and yet one is not subject to capital pun-
ishment for either crime. To use the Court's example, a reckless driver
who kills someone will not be executed.'" In addition to the harm of
killing another person, one must have the proper mens rea with respect
to that particular harm-at minimum, reckless indifference to human
life.16
In sum, Payne endorses capital punishment based on consequences.
But not any consequences will do; nor will any person who happens to
cause the particular harmful consequences do. The defendant must first
have comnitted murder. Payne does not sanction the execution of inno-
cents, of criminals, or even of all those guilty of homicide-despite the
fact that in the case of manslaughter and negligent homicide, the victim
is just as (lead and the victim, victim's family and society are just as
harmed as if the victim had been murdered. Payne does not even sanc-
tion capital punishment for all murderers who cause great harm. Capital
punishment may be imposed, however, if one causes a particular kind of
harm, as evidenced by the personal characteristics of the victim and the
impact on the family.
None of the analogies to harm in non-capital contexts justify the sub-
stantive normative thesis endorsed by Payne: that capital punishment
may be imposed and the life of a human being (albeit a murderer) taken
on the basis of harm to the victim, even if unforeseeable. Parts IV and V
explore, respectively, possible retributivist and utilitarian justifications
for the Payne ruling.
163. Standing alone, no other harm will do, not even that of rape. See Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-98 (1977) (plurality opinion of White, J.) (though "highly
reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt for the per-
sonal integrity and autonomy of the female victim, . . . in terms of moral depravity
and of the injury to the person and to the public, [rape] does not compare with
murder").
164. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
165. Of course even if one intentionally kills another, so that there is both harm
and the requisite mens rea with respect to the harm, one will not be subject to
capital punishment, or any other punishment, if one acted in self-defense.
IV. RETRIBuTIVIsT JUSTIFICATIONS
Why should one who commits a crime be punished? One justification
is J.G. Cottingham's desert theory, which states that one is punished
because one deserves it." In the eyes of the Payne Court, one deserves
to be punished for both subjective guilt and objective harm.'67 Unfortu-
nately, the desert theory is a hopeless failure. Apart from the obvious
difficulty of providing no assistance in determining what one deserves,
the desert theory fails as a justification of punishment, as John Mackie
has pointed out, because it is not a justification at all. Rather, it is simply
a restatement of the retributivist position." One must still provide a
reason why one punishes, and why one punishes in a particular way."
One traditional retributivist response is that people will their own
punishment. Ex ante, one chooses to be punished for committing
crimes." If one in fact consented to a particular punishment, that
166. J.G. Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238, 239 (1979).
167. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying -text.
168. John L Mackie, Retributivism: A Test for Ethical Objectivity, in PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 679 (4th ed. 1991).
169. A moral intuitionist might claim that no reason is necessary: the correctness of
the claim that a criminal deserves to be punished (in a particular way) is simply
intuited. Cf. Murphy, supra note 14, at 228. As noted, however, the Court requires
the death penalty be meted out on the basis of rational criteria. McClesky v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 305 (1987). In the absence of contrary reasons, perhaps intuition could
constitute a rational criterion. But where there are rational arguments to the contrary,
to stubbornly cling to intuition does not seem rational. The desired rational state
would seem to be one of "reflective equilibrium" in which intuited moral principles
are brought into harmony with one's considered judgments. See JOHN RAWLS, A THE-
ORY OF JUSTICE 20-22, 48-51 (1971).
170. See Mackie, supra note 168, at 681. Why would one choose to be punished? In
Kant's view, one wills one's own punishment because, as a rational being, one wills
the universalization of the maxim or rule by which one acts. See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDA-
TIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 44-58 (Lewis W. Bech trans., 1969). Thus, if
one murders, one wills the universalization of murder, and hence may be murdered
in return; if one steals, one may be stolen from, and so on. This argument justifies,
indeed requires, the biblical punishment of lex tationis: "An eye for an eye, a tooth
for a tooth." Exodus 21:22-23. Obviously we do not punish in this way, nor could we
even if we thought it justified. How can one steal from one who has nothing to be
stolen? To take the Payne case, would one kill .Payne by repeatedly stabbing him
with a butcher knife? Even if one would-Eighth Amendment prohibitions against
cruel and unusual punishment aside-would one also do the same to his daughter,
supposing he had one? And how would one ensure that the impact on the families
would be the same?
The idea of universalization of the will underwrites the curious arguments that
punishment respects the dignity of humans as rational beings and that the criminal
has a right to be punished. For a discussion, see Mackie, supra at 168. EDMUND
PINCOFFS, THE RATIONALE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT 7-14 (1966).
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would provide a powerful justification. The immediate problem, however,
is that no reason exists to believe that Booth, Gathers or Payne ever
consented.
An alternative is to rest one's justification on hypothetical consent,
that is, to argue not that one actually consented but that a rational per-
son would consent. Of course, what is rational depends on the circum-
stances. The rational choice of one who has just committed murder will
be contra. Payne. Thus, the choice must be considered ex ante. But even
ex ante, one's choice will be influenced by one's personal characteristics.
If one is violent and likely to commit murder, one will not consent to
Payne. To ensure a rational choice, knowledge of one's personal charac-
teristics must be limited. Assume then that one does not know whether
one will be defendant or victim; for all one knows, one might equally be
the murderer or the murdered, or family of the murdered. Having
eliminated such biasing contingencies, one is now in a position to make
a rational choice.''
Would one choose capital punishment based on harm to the victim?"T
No. Ex ante, one does not know whether one will be a murderer or a
victim. Consequently, one must protect against the possibility of ending
up on either side. The stakes on one side are high: one's life. Thus, to
opt for capital punishment based on harm to the victim's family, or on
the victim's character traits, would be to expose oneself to incredibly
high cost. Moreover, one would be doing so for no gain because by defi-
nition, harm to the victim and the victim's family is irrelevant to one's
intention in killing. Unless one is a sadist, one gains nothing from the
171. Precisely what information must be restricted may be debated. For present pur-
poses, one need only ban information that makes it more or less probable that one
would be either victim or defendant. Information and ideas that affect how one
would treat a defendant are permissible. Thus one. may have theories of justice, just
desert, mercy, as well as emotions such as the desire for vengeance and, conversely,
compassion.
172. If so, then one has a response to the question, "What gives the State the right
to punish?" If not, then one has an argument against punishment, even if that punish-
ment is in fact chosen by others. Indeed, that one would not make that choice from
an ex ante position, unbiased by personal characteristics, suggests that actual consent
might be tainted by personal circumstances and immediate self-interest. At the very
least, the discrepancy should give one pause and call into question the moral rele-
vance of the reasons given by those who support such punishment. Of course one
may argue that moral judgments made ex post in light of the full circumstances are
superior to purified ex ante judgments. But at least the burden shifts, requiring more
than mere appeal to vague intuition to justify punishment for all harmful consequenc-
es, whether foreseeable or not.
suffering of the victim and family. To risk one's life for no gain hardly
seems like a rational choice.
Indeed, not only would one's life be at stake, but one would be gam-
bling on the particular characteristics of one's potential victim because
Payne sanctions the death penalty for certain victim harm even if unfore-
seen and unforeseeable. One would be laying one's life on the line on the
basis of circumstances beyond one's control.m
The best way to flesh out the argument may be to consider possible
objections. First, one could argue that while it might be true that there is
nothing to gain should one turn out to be a murderer, there is something
to be gained should one be a victim: vengeance."
Vengeance is generally considered a utilitarian justification of punish-
ment. This utilitarian version of vengeance holds that legal punishment
provides a socially sanctioned "escape valve" for anger and aggressive
feelings, thus avoiding the disutility of citizens taking justice in their own
hands.7 ' Hedonistic vengeance, on the other hand, simply holds that
utility is increased by punishment because some people enjoy the suffer-
ing of criminals.' The problems with vengeance as a utilitarian justifi-
cation of punishment are considered in Part V. At present, our concern is
with vengeance as a rational choice factor.
One could avoid the problem by defining it away. We are interested in
rational choice. Rational beings are not moved by certain emotional and
psychological propensities. Vengeance, a morally suspect emotion to be-
gin with, could be stipulated as one of those emotions. That the Supreme
Court has repeatedly insisted capital punishment must be based on rea-
son, not emotion, provides some justification for such an exclusion.'
But to rule out emotion by fiat weakens the argument. A better solution
is to allow vengeance as a choice factor but argue that one would not
choose the proposed punishment anyway.
173. Of course one would first have to commit murder or be engaged in felony
murder. To that extent, one would have some control. Further, under the weak the-
sis, which imposes punishment only if one is at least reckless, one would be aware
of the potential harm and hence able to consciously weigh the risks.
174. Other potential utilitarian gains from rehabilitation, deterrence, incapacitation,
and denunciation are considered infra notes 189-91, 206-21 and accompanying text.
175. JAMES STEPHENS, 2 A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 75-83 (1882);
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 41-42 (1881).
176. FEINBERG & GROSS, supra note 120 at 650.
177. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508 (1987) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430
U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (opinion of Stevens, J.)). As Murphy has noted, supra note 9, at
1313, the Court's position on vengeance is not entirely clear. Some statements appear
to reject it. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982). On the other hand, the
Court at times has conflated vengeance and retribution. See Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 304 (1972).
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One irmediate difficulty with this alternative is that vengeance may
justify too much. For instance, given the brutality of the murders in
Booth, Gathers and Payne, it is perhaps understandable that one would
desire vengeance. But would the demand for vengeance be any less if the
victim did not possess socially valuable characteristics? What if the mur-
der was less brutal, but the victim was a member of one's family? If one
is vengeful, would one not want capital punishment for anyone who
murders one's family member, regardless of the personal characteristics
of the victim and the perceived impact on the family? If so, then ven-
geance justifies not only the particular act of capital punishment en-
dorsed by Payne, but capital punishment more generally. To consider
vengeance as a justification for Payne, one must be willing to accept
capital punishment at least in every instance where there are survivors
and perhaps in other situations, such as brutal murders. Of course, one
could turn out to be the murderer, so this exposes one to greater risk.
Many might decide against Payne for this reason alone. But some might
be willing to bear the greater risk, so additional argument is needed.
The best argument is simply that one would not opt for capital punish-
ment even if vengeance is allowed as a choice factor. Vengeance, in the
eyes of many, is a base and barbaric emotion not fit for civil society. 8
To be sure, vengeance may seem desirable when one is doing the aveng-
ing, but would one risk one's life for it? Ex post, as victims, in the imme-
diate aftermath of a brutal murder or senseless killing of a loved one, we
may desire vengeance." But ex ante, in one's cool-headed and rational
moments, when one does not know whether one will be victim or mur-
derer, would one wager one's life for such an ignoble emotion as ven-
geance, particularly if the harm for which one is to extract vengeance
was unintended, perhaps even unforeseen and unforeseeable?'" In such
178. One might argue that vengeance is simply not a moral trait and hence cannot
provide a moral justification for anything. But that begs the question. Vengeance may
be a contemptible emotion, but one still might base choices on it, and those choices
provide the moral basis for punishment.
179. But see Deborah P. Kelly, Victims, 34 WAYNE L REV. 69, 74 (1989) (studies
show that most crime victims are not "bloodthirsty vigilantes" bent on extracting pun-
ishment); Deborah P. Kelly, Delivering Legal Services to Victims: An Evaluation and
Prescription, 9 JusT. SyS. J. 62, 74-75 (1984) (studies show victims' satisfaction de-
pends more on involvement in the criminal process than on whether the defendant is
ultimately punished).
180. On the escape valve theory, there is some utility to society in vengeance. But
that utility is spread out over society. Weighed against one's own death, the gain
seems trivial. Taking the hedonistic view, one would have to get a whole lot of plea-
moments, will the desire for the death of another not be offset by mercy
and compassion? After all, if we allow vengeance as a choice factor, we
must allow for mercy and compassion as well.
On balance, then, a rational person would not subject herself to the
risk of capital punishment for unintended (or at least unforeseen and
unforeseeable) harm, even though she might be a victim and desire, ex
post, vengeance.
A second objection is that victims, including the family, will gain
pyschologically from a criminal process that seriously considers harm to
the victim and affords victims an opportunity to participate in bringing
the defendant to justice. Allowing family members to testify as to the
impact of the crime on their lives may be a healing experience, instru-
mental to the recuperative process. Playing an active role in the process
may foster in victims the belief that they are not powerless and that the
world is not radically out of order. As a result, one may feel that one has
regained control over one's life.
But it is debatable whether victims are better off in a criminal process
that affords them a more central role. For starters, such a process may
not be psychologically beneficial. At least one scholar and victim has
suggested that the process is often counterproductive. 8 ' In her view,
victims need to move beyond the tragic event, resume their lives, and
take responsibility for their futures." The judicial focus on assigning
blame and the victim's own quest for vengeance are backward, not for-
ward, looking.
Further, by testifying, the victim becomes a target for blame and cen-
sure during cross-examination. The prospect of being forced to relive
events often long past by the time of trial might be unappealing to many.
But sympathetic victims who do not want to testify may face pressure
from prosecutors who realize a jury will be moved by a firsthand ac-
count of the victim's suffering." Conversely, less sympathetic victims
who do not possess characteristics deemed socially valuable but who
want to testify might be denied the opportunity to do so, further
crushing already fragile egos and diminishing already low self-esteems.
Of course, downtrodden victims and estranged family members may have
no choice but to testify. If a victim's positive characteristics and laudable
family relations are relevant, then a victim's deviant characteristics and
broken family relations are presumably also relevant, and hence admissi-
sure out of the suffering of others to think it worth the chance of losing one's life.
181. See Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937,
997-99 (1985).
182. Id. at 961-63.
183. See Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffering-A Personal Reflection and a Victim-
Centered Critique, 20 FLA. ST. U. L REV. 21 (1992).
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ble-a feature of Payne the Court may have overlooked in assuming that
defendants would not attack their victims for strategic reasons.""
In any event, all those who testify-"good victims" or "bad vic-
tims"-might suffer pangs of guilt if the defendant is ultimately given the
lesser punishment. Members of the family might take this as a sign of
their own shortcomings, thereby exacerbating their feelings of inadequa-
cy." Finally, in some cases victims will not want vengeance, and may
even be opposed to the death penalty. This may put them at odds with
prosecutors. But even when, in the immediate aftermath of the crime,
victims do desire vengeance and willingly aid the prosecutor in pursuing
the death penalty, they may later, when emotions die down, come to
regret their role in the death of another."
Taken together, these points cast serious doubt on the contention that
one would choose capital punishment based on victim harm because of
the benefits from a greater role for the victim in the criminal process.
A third objection is that the argument proves too much. One version is
that the argument would put an end to all capital punishment because no
rational person would risk one's life for anything. But this is misguid-
ed.6 7 People do not place infinite value on their lives; otherwise, there
would be no suicide or euthanasia. One may be willing to risk one's life
to gain something else one values. The problem with Payne is that one
exposes oneself to high risk for no gain, or at best, little gain." But capi-
tal punishment on non-Payne grounds may provide some gain. For in-
stance, suppose capital punishment deters murder." Then one might
consent to capital punishment on the grounds that one's life, or the lives
of others, might be saved by the deterrent effect of capital punishment.
Alternatively, one might think that children and the elderly are particu-
larly vulnerable and deserving of protection. Again, if one believes that
capital punishment deters, then it might be rational to risk death by sanc-
184. Id. See also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (holding that a
defendant may not be prevented from offering evidence relevant to issues in criminal
trial); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 96-97 (1979) (per curiam) (stating that the same
rule applies in a capital sentencing hearing).
185. Berger, supra note 183.
186. Id.
187. Even if correct-and the argument ultimately supports an end to all capital
punishment-so be it. There should then be less capital punishment, not more.
188. In addition to vengeance, there may be slight utilitarian gains from deterrence
and incapacitation. See infra notes 189-90, 206-21 and accompanying text.
189. This article takes no position on the actual deterrence of capital punishment.
tioning capital punishment for killing children or the elderly. One might
take the risk because one presumably will also be a child and an elder;
hence, one will be protecting one's own life. Or, one might take the risk
simply because one feels that protecting the lives of children and elderly
is valuable in itself. Either way, one would only risk capital punishment
if one believed such punishment would deter the particular kind of kill-
ing. However, where the status of the victim is unforeseeable, nothing
(or very little) in the way of deterrence is gained through capital punish-
ment."0
Moreover, capital punishment under Payne will not act as a deterrent
because one may be executed for harm that is not part of one's intention
or motive in killing, and may not even be foreseeable. Of course, one
could argue that imposing capital punishment will provide the defendant
with an incentive to investigate his victims more carefully in order to
ascertain their socially valuable characteristics and the state of their
family relations beforehand. But that is, to put it charitably, far-fetched.
As the Booth Court noted, defendants do not select their victims with an
eye on anyone's harm other than the victim's. 9' At most, the deterrent
effect would be minimal.
A second version of the third objection holds that the argument proves
too much because one would not choose punishment based on unfore-
seen consequences in any context. This too is misguided. A rational per-
son might consent to strict liability offenses even if she would not con-
sent to Payne. At least as defined by the Model Penal Code, the potential
cost, and hence risk, is much less. As noted previously, the Code would
limit punishment for strict liability offenses to a fine, forfeiture or other
civil penalty."9 One would not be imprisoned, much less subject to
death. Further, one would not suffer the social stigma and moral con-
demnation of being labelled a criminal. The Code refers to strict liability
offenses as "violations" and requires that a conviction "not give rise to
190. Thus, one might consent to statutes authorizing the death penalty for the
assassination of the President and other various public officials on the grounds that
such persons are of great social value and deserving of protection, or because one
might oneself be such a person. But again, one will consent only if one believes
there is a deterrent, and hence would reject capital punishment where the status of
the victim was unforeseeable and unforeseen (given the unlikely effect of deterrence
as an incentive to investigate).
One could argue that capital punishment provides additional deterrence. The
simple fact that more murderers will be killed will make all murder less likely,
including murder accompanied by the kind of harm at issue in Payne. But if the goal
is to deter all murder, then one should make the punishment for any murder more
severe. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
191. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504-05 (1987).
192. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(5) (1985).
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any disability or legal disadvantage."" On the benefit side, there are
considerable potential gains. Strict liability offenses, which are best limit-
ed to regulatory offenses, are designed to enhance public safety. By low-
ering the burden on the prosecutor, strict liability statutes allow for
greater apprehension of those who endanger the public. This stops the
immediate offense and provides both a deterrent and mild denunciatory
effect, culminating in enhanced safety. Given the low cost, a rational
person might conclude the benefits outweigh the costs and consent to
such punishment.
The costs are obviously higher for criminal punishment based on an
unforeseeable type or degree of harm. Consequently, a rational person
would be less likely to consent to such punishment than to strict liability
sanctions. But this squares with earlier observations. '" In actual prac-
tice, the general rule is not to punish based on the type of harm caused
when the requisite mens rea with respect to that particular harm is lack-
ing. While some courts have punished according to the degree of harm
even in the absence of the requisite mens rea, that practice has been
condemned by the Model Penal Code and others.' That there would be
some debate on this subject is understandable. The costs are not as high
as in Payne, but they are higher than for strict liability. The gain then be-
comes all the more important. If the degree of harm is unforeseeable,
then there will usually be no gain from the additional harm.' However,
if the defendant was reckless with respect to the degree of harm, one
might conclude that opting for the punishment would enhance caution,
thereby providing sufficient deterrent gain.
As discussed previously, one may be liable even for unforeseen conse-
quences in the non-criminal tort context. 7 But this too is understand-
able, and arguably a rational choice. The law of torts concerns not capi-
tal punishment, but monetary compensation. The issue is who should
bear the economic loss. Ex ante, one will not know whether one will be
the compensator or the compensated." Compared to Payne, the poten-
193. Id
194. See s-upra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
196. In some instances there will be gain. For instance, a mugger whose victim
happens to have $1000 instead of the anticipated $10 will gain from the additional
economic harm. But in many cases, there will be no gain. Indeed, the defendant
might even regret the additional harm. An example would be a defendant who merely
wants to scare someone but who breaks that person's nose.
197. See supra notes 14245 and accompanying text.
198. In economic terms, one will not know whether one will be the least cost
tial gains are higher and the risk lower. If the risk still seems too high, in
many instances one may purchase insurance.
Another objection is that one might, despite the risks, choose capital
punishment for reckless or unforeseen harm on account of either of two
traditional retributivist reasons for punishment: annulment of the crime
or fair play. The annulment theory, as the name suggests, holds that
punishment somehow annuls the crime.'" If the idea is simply that pun-
ishment restores the status quo ante, then the theory is clearly absurd.
Although restitution may be possible in some instances, such as those
involving monetary crimes, it is obviously not possible to restore a mur-
der victim to life or a rape victim to an unviolated state. An alternative
interpretation is that the wrong that is annulled is the general infringe-
ment of another's rights.' However, punishing the criminal cannot un-
do that infringement. Perhaps a more plausible view is that what is an-
nulled is the unfair advantage one gains if one is allowed to break the
law and go unpunished. But this interpretation is better understood in
terms of the fair play argument.
The fair play argument begins with the observation that we live in a
competitive society of scarce goods and limited resources. Laws regulate
the competition, imposing constraints on what one can do to secure
available goods. One who violates the law gains an unfair advantage.
Punishment offsets the unfair advantage and restores equilibrium."'
Of course, under Payne, the murderer is going to be punished, and
severely. Thus he will not gain an unfair advantage in the sense that he
will have gotten off scot-free. Nevertheless, one could argue that there is
still an unfair advantage. In our earlier hypothetical, D1, who murdered
the wealthy doctor with the loving family, caused greater harm than D2,
who murdered the homeless person without kin. To give both Dl and D2
the same punishment would not be fair to D2 or to the family of Dl's
victim. Capital punishment is that little something extra that offsets the
greater harm and restores fairness.
Does D1 actually gain an extra advantage for which he is not pun-
ished? Both D1 and D2 killed with the same intentions and for the same
motives. The additional harm to the victim and family at issue in Payne
was not part of Dl's intent. Indeed, the harm was unforeseen and per-
haps unforeseeable. Again, unless D1 is a sadist, he gains nothing from
the additional harm to the victim. It is not some added benefit thrown in
to sweeten the deal. In fact, had he known, he might not have committed
avoider.
199. The most famous spokesperson for this view is Hegel. See GEORGE HEGEL, PHI-
LOSOPHY OF RIGHT 69-70 (1942); Cottingham, supra note 166, at 244-45.
200. Cf. PINCOFFS, supra note 170, at 10-12.
201. Makdde, supra note 168, at 680; Cottingham, supra note 166, at 242-43.
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the murder. Ex post, he might sincerely regret the harm he caused oth-
ers.
Does D'I at least gain the advantage of a lesser punishment relative to
total harm caused? Such an argument puts the cart before the horse. He
must first have some independent unfair gain to merit additional punish-
ment. That is, we do not know whether he deserves the greater or lesser
punishment until we establish that there has been some unfairness. That
requires an independent substantive gain. The lesser punishment itself
cannot constitute that gain.
Of course, critics of Payne who support the weak thesis may feel that
the real unfairness involves not D1 but D3. D3, unlike Dl, was subjective-
ly aware of the risk of harm, and hence arguably more culpable than Dl.
To give D3 the same punishment as D1 and D2 is unfair to the latter two.
The unfair advantage cannot be the harm itself, however, because D3
gains no more from unintended harm than Dl. Perhaps what D3 gains is
self-indulgence by taking substantial and unjustified risks that those who
play by the rules of the law do not. But DI also does not play by the
rules, and in that sense is comparable to D3.
Though one may be hard pressed to say what D3 unfairly gains, the
feeling that D3 is nevertheless more culpable than D1 remains. The sense
that a reckless defendant deserves to be punished for harm caused pro-
vides the basis for one last objection to the rational choice argument.
Though not helpful to Payne supporters, one might claim that the
argument does indeed prove too much. Even the Booth majority appears
to recognize that recklessness is sufficient mens rea with respect to vic-
tim harm.' But the argument suggests an intent standard. After all, if
one does not gain anything from the unintended harm to the victim, why
expose oneself to the high risk of capital punishment?
Whether one would opt for intent or recklessness is a close call. As a
victim, there would be gains from setting the mens rea at recklessness
that are not present for unforeseen and unforeseeable harm. The reckless
offender is subjectively aware of the risk of harm, and hence deterrable
(if deterrence is in fact effective in such circumstances, an assumption
questioned previously). To the extent that vengeance is a factor, one
would expect a greater demand for revenge where the offender con-
sciously disregarded the risk of causing harm than where the harm was
unforeseeable. Indeed, the demand for vengeance may be greater pre-
202. See supra note 133 and accompanying text
cisely because one feels that the offender is more culpable with respect
to consequences for which he possessed at least recklessness.
To set the level at intent would be to allow reckless offenders to go
unpunished for harm for which they were subjectively aware and mental-
ly culpable. Qua victim, one would find this objectionable. Conversely,
qua offender, one would be more willing to accept punishment for reck-
less harm than unforeseen and unforeseeable harm because such harm is
within one's control. One is aware of the risk and can choose either to
take that risk or not, knowing full well what the cost may be. Reckless-
ness therefore appears to be the point where the interests of the ex ante
victim and offender converge.'
Though perhaps persuasive at first blush, the argument for a reckless-
ness standard is subject to many of the same criticisms aimed at capital
punishment based on unforeseen harm. For instance, the reasons why
vengeance is insufficient to justify capital punishment remain persuasive
even where the defendant is reckless and hence more blameworthy.'
Similarly, deterrence, though a somewhat more plausible ground with re-
spect to recklessness, is still unlikely to tip the scales in favor of capital
punishment. Apart from the general question of whether capital punish-
ment does in fact deter, one may doubt whether someone about to com-
mit murder and already running the risk of capital punishment will be
greatly deterred by the additional threat of execution for reckless harm
to the victim.
To be sure, one who recklessly causes harm may be more culpable
than one who could not have foreseen the harm caused, and hence may
deserve more punishment. But capital punishment? Would one want to
execute someone--or be executed-on the basis of unintended but reck-
less harm? Given the huge difference between life in prison and capital
punishment, it is unlikely that one would choose, ex ante, to impose
such a high cost on recklessness-especially since one does not gain
from such unintended consequences.' Further, the defendant need not
203. If this objection holds and the offender would consent to capital punishment
for reckless harm, then the state may have the right to execute the offender. Wheth-
er the state is right in doing so is another issue. Punishing deserving offenders is not
the only goal or moral consideration. One must also consider how the execution of
criminals affects other moral principles. Executing some murderers because their vic-
tims had certain socially valuable characteristics conflicts with the state's
committment to equal protection for all of its citizens. See also Willmott, supra note
13. For conflict with other values, see infra notes 228-40 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
205. As one of its aggravating circumstances for capital punishment, the Model
Penal Code requires that "[t]he defendant knowingly create[] a great risk of death to
many persons." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3) (1985). Two points are noteworthy.
First, knowledge, though less than intent, is a higher standard than recklessness.
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go unpunished. There are various punishments short of execution, in-
cluding delayed parole. Even where the base penalty is life imprisonment
without possibility of parole, other punishment possibilities exist, such as
withholding various prison privileges.
In sum, the argument that, ex ante, a rational person would not con-
sent to the punishment proscribed in Payne (or endorsed by the weak
thesis) appears to hold against the objections considered thus far, includ-
ing several standard retributivist arguments for punishment. The next
section explores utilitarian justifications for Payne.
V. UTILITARIAN JUSTIFICATIONS
Part II argued that the Payne Court's penal theory is best understood
as retributivist. Nevertheless, the Court may be able to draw on utilitari-
an (or consequentialist) justifications of punishment, broadly construed
to include rehabilitation, incapacitation, deterrence, denunciation and
vengeance.
Rehabilitation obviously cannot support Payne or any capital punish-
ment because a dead person cannot be rehabilitated.
Incapacitation is a utilitarian justification for punishment in that the
prisoner is less likely to cause further harm in prison than on the streets.
Capital punishment is the ultimate form of incapacitation. As such, exe-
cution has certain advantages over imprisonment. A prisoner could es-
cape and cause harm or cause harm within the prison.' A dead person
obviously could not.
But the chances of a prisoner causing further harm are not great. Only
one out of five hundred convicted murderers commits another mur-
der. 7 And convicted murderers are no more likely to commit further
crimes than any other class of convicted felons.' Further, there is no
way of identifying in advance the one in five hundred that will commit
another murder, or those who will commit another crime. Thus, to gain
Second, the harm is death to many persons-a harm considerably greater than the
victim harm contemplated in Payne. Given the severity of the punishment and the
lesser harm, to impose a higher mens rea requirement (i.e., intent) would seem
reasonable. See id.
206. In addition, society is harmed by the cost of imprisonment, though capital
punishment is arguably more expensive given the many appeals. See BEDAU, supra
note 15, at 34-38, 239.
207. Id. at 32.
208. Id.
the marginal benefit of one less murder and slightly less crime, one
would have to execute all five hundred.' Our society, which imposes
capital punishment on the basis of individualized determination,"' does
not engage in this kind of statistical mass execution. Nor could such a
practice be justified on utilitarian grounds.
As a general justification of the death penalty, capital punishment cum
incapacitation fails. It, therefore, also fails as a justification of Payne. In
our earlier hypothetical, D1, D2 and D3 all committed murder. Only D1
and D3 were subject to the death penalty under Payne because of unin-
tended (and for D1 unforeseeable) victim harm. But unless the fact that
D1 and D3 caused the victim... and family harm is an indicator that
they are more likely than D2 to commit further harm-which is highly
unlikely given that the harm was unintended (and for Dl unforesee-
able)-then there is no more reason from the standpoint of incapacita-
tion to execute Dl and D3 than D2. Either one executes them all (and all
others) or none. Our legal system has already rejected the former; we do
not execute all intentional murderers.
As noted previously, deterrence fails as a justification for Payne be-
cause the defendant is punished for harm that is not intended and per-
haps not even foreseeable.2 Payne does provide an incentive to inves-
tigate the personal characteristics and family relations of one's victims.
But few murderers are likely to act on that in practice. If the goal is to
deter murder, a better approach would be to raise the penalty for murder
itself, not for particular results."3
The goal might be to deter only the murder of persons with socially
valuable characteristics and loving families. If so, then Payne can hardly
be justified by the expressive or denunciatory function of punishment.
Denunciation serves as a utilitarian justification on the theory that pun-
ishment educates and instills in the public right-minded values, thereby
promoting social cohesion. What message does Payne send? That the law
209. Id. at 33.
210. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
211. That is, DI and D3 would have had to cause harm to society based on the
personal characteristics of the victim. Obviously D2 also causes the victim harm.
212. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
213. A similar suggestion was made with respect to felony murder by Oliver
Wendell Holmes:
[I]f a man does an act with intent to commit a felony, and thereby acciden-
tally kills another .... [t]he fact that the shooting is felonious does not
make it any more likely to kill people. If the object of the rule is to prevent
such accidents, it should make accidental killing with firearms murder, not
accidental killing in the effort to steal; while, if its object is to prevent steal-
ing, it would do better to hang one thief in every thousand by lot.
HoLMEs, supra note 175, at 57-58.
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will offer greater protection to investment bankers than indigent migrant
workers? That all citizens are not equal in the eyes of the law? That
people with loving families are more deserving of protection than single
people?.. That a rational murderer should prey on the poor and un-
wanted? How Payne will promote social cohesion is difficult to fath-
om.
215
Vengeance was discussed earlier as a rational choice factor. Ven-
geance, either of the escape valve variety or the hedonistic, is also a
utilitarian justification of punishment.2 '6 However, as a general justifica-
tion of punishment, vengeance, like all utilitarian justifications, is prone
to justify too much. One might punish the innocent in the name of ven-
geance, even torture them. Of course the defendant in Payne is not in-
nocent and one could perhaps construct a utilitarian argument against
torture. Nevertheless, as discussed previously, vengeance cannot be so
narrowly constrained as to justify only Payne. 7 Rather, if one accepts
vengeance as a justification, then one must be willing to tolerate a much
greater incidence of capital punishment.
One could further chip away at vengeance as a justification of Payne
by pointing out that the family will not always desire vengeance, given
that many consider it a base and morally objectionable emotion, to be
offset by the virtues of mercy and compassion. One could also at-
tempt to show less objectionable ways of channeling social and individu-
al anger than capital punishment. 9 Or one could argue that, on bal-
ance, utility favors punishment justified on nonvengeance grounds if only
because it creates a more humane society, and that there are utilitarian
benefits to such a society.
But such arguments are largely beside the point. The main difficulty
214. For an argument that punishment based on victim impact evidence violates the
equal protection clause, see Willmott, supra note 13.
215. One might argue that the Court is sending the message that victims are not
"valueless fungibles," but unique human beings. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597,
2615 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring). But, as noted, that much is already known to all
and true of all victims. Id. at 2631 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, it does not explain
the protection that Payne affords to certain victims to the exclusion of others.
216. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 178-79.
219. Cf. Howard C. Rubel, Victim Participation in Sentencing Proceedings, 28
CRIM. L Q. 226, 242 (1986) (arguing in favor of offering victims an opportunity to
participate in the sentencing process, and affording them a more effective means of
venting their anger and frustration).
with vengeance, and indeed With Payne, is that it violates cherished
moral principles. There are limits to how far one may be treated as an
end. In our society, people have rights.'s Utilitarian theories, and
Payne, fail to take these rights seriously."
Of course rights are not absolute. Even the right to life may be over-
come. Otherwise there would be no justified killing in self-defense, no
war, and no capital punishment.' The argument here, however, is that
the utilitarian or consequential gains do not sanction the death penalty.
The gains are either too small (as with deterrence and incapacitation) or
not of sufficient moral worth to override such a fundamental right as the
right to life (as with vengeance).
One often suggested justification for overriding the right to life and
imposing capital punishment is that a murderer, in violating the rights of
another, forfeits his own right to life.' But to return to our hypotheti-
cal, both D1' and D2 committed murder and violated the rights of an-
other. Thus either both have forfeited their right to life, or neither has. If
both have, then execute both. To punish only D1 in the name of forfei-
ture is to claim that D1 forfeits his right to life not for violating another's
right to life-for murder-but rather for causing harmful consequences.
Thus, Dl's right to life is trumped by consequentialist concerns.
But prisoners' rights are not so easily compromised. One cannot do
with a prisoner-even a murderer-as one wills." That much is guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment. For instance, in the same term it de-
cided Payne, the Supreme Court declared: "[W]e have no doubt" prison-
ers possess "a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted admin-
istration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."'
Similarly, the Eighth Amendment, in proscribing cruel and unusual
220. In the stirring words of two prominent and ideologically disparate philosophers:
"Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of
the society as a whole cannot override." RAWLS, supra note 169, at 3. "Individuals
have rights and there are things no person or group may do to them [without vio-
lating their rights]." ROBERT NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ix (1974).
221. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
222. Nor would there be abortion, assuming the fetus is either a life or a potential
life with a right to life.
223. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 172 at 400-01 (Peter Laslett ed.,
2d ed. 1970). For a discussion and critique of the notion of forfeiture of rights as a
basis for capital punishment generally, see BEDAU, supra note 15, at 12-15, 55-59.
224. The argument applies equally to D3, but for the sake of simplicity in explica-
tion I refer only to Dl not D1 and D3.
225. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
226. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (holding State's procedures
in administering medication sufficient to satisfy due process clause).
[Vol. 20: 25, 1992] A Philosophical Critique of Payne v. Tennessee
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
punishment, also limits what the State may do to criminals.' And wheth-
er the punishment in Payne is cruel and unusual is precisely the issue. A
punishment without moral justification is cruel. One that compromises
the right to life to secure negligible utilitarian gains or to appease
another's appetite for vengeance is both cruel and unusual-cruel be-
cause morally unjustified, and unusual because our society is not in the
practice of trading human lives for meager utilitarian gains. The utilitari-
an-vengeance benefit of executing a murderer for unforeseen harm to the
victim is nothing compared to the benefit of appropriating his organs to
save the lives of five needy people. But surely one would not tolerate or
condone as a just punishment the forced donation of a murderer's or-
gans. How then can one justify Payne on vengeance-utilitarian grounds?
Even were one to concede that a murderer gives up his right to life,
thereby providing the State the right to impose capital punishment,
would the State be right to do so under Payne? The taking of life based
on consequences and for slight utilitarian gains is inconsistent with the
importance that our society and the Court places on the preservation'
and sanctity of human life.'
The State's interest in life is manifested in a variety of ways: differen-
tial treatment afforded capital punishment, efforts to prevent suicide,'a
statutes restricting abortion," antipathy to wrongful life and birth
suits,' and opposition to right to die initiatives and living wills.m
However, the interest is not absolute and may be overridden by individu-
al interests,' including autonomy, 5 privacy,' and liberty.3 7 But
227. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII, § 1.
228. In Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990), the Court
stated that the State "relies on its interest in the protection and preservation of
human life, and there can be no gainsaying this interest." Id. at 2852. See also Phillip
G. Peters, Jr., The State's Interest in Preservation of Life: From Quinlan to Cruzan,
50 OHIO ST. L.J. 891 (1989).
229. "The State's interest in life embraces two separate concerns: an interest in the
prolongation of the life of the individual patient and an interest in the sanctity of life
itself." Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), affd, Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). See also infra note 234.
230. E.g., Superintendent of Belchertwon State School v. Saikwicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
425 (Mass. 1977).
231. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.010-.220 (1986).
232. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § i88.130 (1986).
233. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.010-.055 (1986). See also Gregory Gelfand, Living
Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 Wis. L REV. 737 (1987); Peters, supra note 228
passim.
234. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
our legal system does not sacrifice the State's interest in life for minimal
utilitarian gains. Indeed, one often-cited reason opposing suicide and
right-to-die actions is that toleration of suicide, withholding medical
treatment and allowing voluntary euthanasia may lead us down a slippery
slope to involuntary withholding of treatment based on social costs and
involuntary active "euthanasia" of those deemed to be social liabili-
ties.'
In sum, even if the State had the moral right to take life under Payne,
it arguably would not be right to do so-at least by the Court's own
"[T]he State's interest [in the preservation and sanctity of life] contra weakens and
the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and
the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual's rights
overcome the State interest." Id. at 664. In practice, at least prior to Cruzan, the
interests of the patient in refusing medical treatment were deemed to outweigh State
interests. Courts permitted not only terminally ill but nonterminally ill patients to
refuse medical treatment, even though in some instances the treatment would have
returned the patient to reasonably good health. E.g., Commissioner of Correction v.
Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 458 (Mass. 1979) (holding that the right to privacy from
invasion caused by hemodialysis outweighs the State interest in preservation of life,
even though not in prison control). Patients were also allowed to refuse less invasive
treatment. Peters, supra note 228, at 897.
The Supreme Court's Cruzan decision, however, breathes new life into what was
a nearly moribund State interest In Cruzan, the Court acknowledged that a patient
has a "liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment" under the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health,
110 S. Ct at 2851. Cruzan explicitly rejected the right to privacy in favor of a liberty
interest as the basis for an individual's right to refuse treatment. I. at 2851 n.7. But
that interest must be balanced against the relevant state interests, including the
protection and preservation of human life. Id. at 2851-52. Further, the Court held that
a state may refuse to consider the quality of the individual's life, and "simply assert
an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed against the
constitutionally protected interests of the individual." Id. at 2853. While not explicitly
endorsing a sanctity of life principle, the Court's rejection of quality of life consid-
erations achieves the same end in that, as Judge Robertson noted, "[tlhe state's con-
cern with the sanctity of life rests on the principle that life is precious and worthy
of preservation without regard to its quality." Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419
(Mo. 1988) (en banc), £,ffd, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841
(1990).
235. For a thorough discussion of the preference for autonomy, see Peters, supra
note 228, at 930-33.
236. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that a woman's right to
privacy, though not absolute or "unqualified," outweighs State interest in "protecting
potential life").
237. See Cr-zan, 110 S. Ct at 2851-52. In Cruzan, the Court assumed for the pur-
poses of the case that a competent person had a "constitutionally protected right to
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition." Id. at 2852. While it noted that the "logic
of the cases" involving such treatment would implicate a liberty interest, this interest
would have to be weighed against the state interests in preservation of life. Id.
238. Peters, supra note 228, at 961-75.
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enunciated moral principles.'
VI. CONCLUSION
None of the arguments considered provides a moral justification for
the substantive thesis of Payne. Neither the retributivist nor utilitarian
arguments justify the imposition of capital punishment for unforeseen
harm measured by the personal characteristics of the victim and impact
on the victim's family. That a rational person would not consent to such
a punishment ex ante and under conditions of uncertainty as to one's
own status as victim or murderer suggests that the Court's decision is
misguided. Furthermore, to impose the death penalty for negligible utili-
tarian gains violates moral principles deeply rooted in our society and
championed by the Court itself.
At issue is a particular act of punishment. The arguments are not in-
tended to challenge, nor do they challenge, all capital punishment, all
consequence-based punishment, all unforeseen or unforeseeable conse-
quence-based punishment or all punishment based on victim harm. Some
capital punishment may be justifiable.' ° Clearly, some consequence-
based punishment is permissible. For example, fixing punishment in
accordance with the harm caused is not objectionable where the actor
possesses the requisite mens rea with respect to that harm. Similarly,
punishment may be justified if the consequences for which one is to be
punished are statutorily defined in advance and foreseeable. Strict liabili-
ty offenses are arguably justified where there are potential gains and the
punishment is limited to relatively minor civil penalties. Victim harm, one
type of consequence, will generally be relevant in those instances where
consequences are relevant."
The raniifications of the arguments are several. One conclusion is that
the instances of morally justified life-taking for consequentialist reasons
are limited, and execution on the basis of unforseen or unforeseeable
consequences is not one of those instances. An alternate conclusion,
arguments of philosophers and judges notwithstanding, is that rights are
239. This article does not endorse the "sanctity of life" principle-at least if the
principle is mderstood to place an infinite value on human life or to prohibit all util-
itarian trade-offs whatsoever. The point is simply that Payne is inconsistent with that
principle (and the State's interest in preservation of life).
240. This article takes no position on this issue.
241. In addition, there may be circumstances where victim harm, or a particular
kind of victim harm, is especially relevant.
overrated and that human life may be traded for consequentialist rea-
sons, at least more often than is the current practice. This conclusion
could in turn influence one's position on other sensitive issues such as
abortion, wrongful life, withholding of treatment and euthanasia.
Either way, the impact of Payne is likely to be limited. Payne does not
sanction consequential life-taking of the innocent, or even of those who
cause great harm to the victim, the victim's family and society. One must
first commit murder. This provides a clear line to distinguish Payne from
other consequence-based killing, and will almost assuredly prevent the
extension of consequentialist reasoning to other areas such as the right
to die. 2
2
On a less theoretical and more practical level, the impact of Payne will
most likely also be limited. In many instances, the murderer will be sub-
ject to the death penalty even without the additional victim impact evi-
dence. Further, such evidence will often constitute part of the circum-
stances of the crime and hence be imparted to the jury during the guilt
phase of the trial. Often the defendant will be aware of the potential
harm and, thus, culpable even under the Booth Court's recklessness stan-
dard.' Nevertheless, as Justice Stevens observed in his Payne dissent:
"In reaching our decision today... we should not be concerned with the
cases in which victim impact evidence will not make a difference. We
should be concerned instead with the cases in which it will make a dif-
ference." ' To the unfortunate defendant whose victim happens to pos-
sess the right combination of socially valuable assets and a loving family,
Payne will make all the difference in the world.
242. Of potentially wider theoretical significance is the Court's sanctioning of a sub-
stantive penal theory that imposes punishment on the basis of, both subjective guilt
and objective harm, even where the latter is unforeseen and unforeseeable.
243. They would not be liable for capital punishment if the standard was intent, as
argued here.
244. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2630 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
